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TECHNOLOGY AND THE GUILTY MIND: 
WHEN DO TECHNOLOGY PROVIDERS 
BECOME CRIMINAL ACCOMPLICES? 
BENTON MARTIN* & 
JEREMIAH NEWHALL** 
The creators of today’s most successful technologies share an 
important willingness to push the envelope—a drive that propels digital 
industry forward. This same drive, however, can lead some technology 
purveyors to push the limits of legality or even become scofflaws in their 
pursuit of innovation or (more often) profit. The United States must figure 
out how to harness the important creative force at the heart of the hacker 
ethic while still deterring destructive criminal wrongdoers. Because it is 
often courts that must answer this question, it is essential to examine the 
legal doctrines prosecutors use to sweep up technology providers. 
This Article focuses on one type of criminal liability—accomplice 
liability—that can act as a dragnet on providers of technology that lends 
itself to criminal use. In particular, a violation of the federal statute for 
aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2, can be implied in every charge for a 
federal substantive offense, and there is a potentially troubling strain of 
cases holding that knowing assistance can be enough to deem someone an 
aider and abettor, even without stronger evidence of a shared criminal 
purpose. 
This Article examines when the proprietors of technology with 
criminal uses aid and abet their users’ crimes. The aim is to help courts, 
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most especially to Karina Newhall, my constant accomplice. 
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prosecutors, and technologists draw the line between joining a criminal 
enterprise and merely providing technology with criminal uses. This Article 
explains the legal doctrines underlying this type of liability and provides 
examples of at-risk technologies, including spam software, file-sharing 
services, and anonymity networks like Tor. Ultimately, this Article 
concludes that the web of superficially conflicting rulings on the required 
mental state for aiding and abetting are best harmonized—and future 
rulings on liability for new technologies are best predicted—by looking to 
the existence of “substantial unoffending uses” for the product or service 
provided by the accused technologist. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Doctor Samuel Mudd awoke at four in the morning to find a patient at 
his door with a broken leg.1 After Mudd took the man inside his home, he 
set and bandaged the leg. Lacking proper materials for a splint, Mudd broke 
apart his own bandbox (a thin wooden box for clothes), and then sent for a 
carpenter to make a pair of crutches.2 Mudd’s patient left within a day, and 
the two never met again. But within weeks, Mudd was arrested and then 
convicted of treason,3 all for doing what doctors have always done: treating 
a patient in agony who came to his home in the middle of the night. This 
patient, however, had been John Wilkes Booth, and he had broken his leg in 
his flight from authorities after assassinating President Lincoln.4 
Just as doctors think of themselves as neutral parties—helping cops 
and criminals alike—today’s digital technology pioneers see themselves as 
neutral parties distributing their wares without partisanship. “A common 
hacker refrain,” journalist Brendan Koerner writes, “is that technology is 
always morally neutral. The culture’s libertarian ethos holds that creators 
shouldn’t be faulted if someone uses their gadget or hunk of code to cause 
harm.”5 But innovation in the Internet age is so fast-paced (and generally 
messy) that legislators have scrambled to craft new punishments for new 
crimes, such as spam email and Internet hacking, further blurring the lines 
that separate innocent creators from criminal users.6 When technology lends 
 
1 THE LIFE OF DR. SAMUEL A. MUDD 19 (Nettie Mudd ed., 1906) [hereinafter “LIFE OF 
MUDD”] (collecting original letters and documents).  
2 Statement of Dr. S.A. Mudd in the Matter of the Murder of the President, National 
Archives M-599, reel 5, frames 212–25, at 29–33 (1865).  
3 LIFE OF MUDD, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
4 See id. at 88–92 (arguments by Dr. Mudd’s defense attorney about evidence of Mudd’s 
and Booth’s acquaintance). Dr. Mudd’s attorney, Thomas Ewing, pointedly asked, as Dr. 
Mudd was accused of conspiring with Booth, whether breaking his own leg had been part of 
Booth’s plan. Id. at 88. 
5 Brendan I. Koerner, Alfred Anaya Put Secret Compartments in Cars. So the DEA Put 
Him in Prison, WIRED (Mar. 19, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/
03/alfred-anaya/all/, archived at http://perma.cc/G4VH-47GH; see also ERIC SCHMIDT & 
JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND 
BUSINESS 66 (2013) (“The central truth of the technology industry—that technology is 
neutral but people are not—will periodically be lost amid all the noise.”). 
6 See Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 403, 403 (2013). As Kerr noted: 
Changing technology presents a recurring problem for lawmakers. Laws are enacted with a 
background understanding of the facts. When those facts change, the effect of the old legal rules 
can change along with them. A law created for one world may have a very different impact when 
applied to the facts of a different era. As a result, changing technology and social practice often 
trigger a need for legal adaptation. Maintaining the function of old rules can require changing 
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itself to illegal use, courts must sort out the creators’ criminal culpability: 
whether a cyberlocker’s CEO is guilty of copyright infringement,7 whether 
the creator of an anonymous online marketplace violated drug laws,8 or 
whether software programmers should be jailed for enabling spam.9 As Dr. 
Mudd learned, criminal law sometimes requires citizens to take sides, lest 
they be accused by the government of aiding and abetting criminals. 
The scope of the federal statute for aiders and abettors, 18 U.S.C. § 2, 
is incredibly broad—it can be implied in every charge for a federal 
substantive offense10—and the notions of remoteness from the substantive 
criminal act used to limit the liability of criminal accessories are relatively 
untested in regard to Internet crime. Further, the Supreme Court in 
Rosemond v. United States, expressly left unresolved how § 2 applies to 
those who “incidentally facilitate a criminal venture” by providing a 
product or service, “knowing but not caring” about the principal’s criminal 
intent.11 The Court also arguably breathed new life into the strain of 
decisions holding that knowing assistance is enough to be an aider and 
abettor, even without stronger evidence of a shared criminal purpose.12 
Many accused technologists13 try to exculpate themselves, with mixed 
success, by claiming ignorance of specific instances of their technology’s 
criminal use. But unfortunately for today’s technologists, the defense of 
lack of knowledge has dwindled in a world flooded with information. 
This Article examines when the proprietors of technology with 
criminal uses aid and abet their users’ crimes.14 The aim is to help courts, 
 
those rules to adapt to the new environment. 
Id. 
7 See generally Benton Martin & Jeremiah Newhall, Criminal Copyright Enforcement 
Against Filesharing Services, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101 (2013) (analyzing charges of 
criminal copyright infringement against the cyberlocker Megaupload). 
8 See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-00068 (S.D.N.Y., 
Aug. 21, 2014), ECF No. 52. 
9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Software Writer Pleads Guilty to Aiding 
and Abetting Detroit Spam Conspiracy (July 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-664.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9UZ6-8RW8. 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990). 
11 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249 n.8 (2014). 
12 See id. at 1248–49 (noting approvingly that the Court has found the requisite intent for 
aiding and abetting “when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with full 
knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense”).  
13 As used in this Article, the term “technologist” is intended to cover a wide variety of 
actors involved in developing, promoting, and managing the operation of technology. 
14 This Article grapples with the question left open by Rosemond and goes further to 
examine when proprietors of technology with both legal and illegal uses aid and abet their 
users’ crimes. The question in Rosemond was limited to the merchant who knows but does 
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prosecutors, and technologists draw the line between joining a criminal 
enterprise and merely providing technology with criminal uses. Ultimately, 
this Article concludes that the web of superficially conflicting rulings on the 
required mental state for aiding and abetting are best harmonized—and 
future rulings on liability for new technologies best predicted—by looking 
to the existence of “substantial unoffending uses” for the product or service 
provided by the technologist accused of aiding and abetting. 
I. THE HACKER ETHIC 
To understand the mentality of technologists who skirt the edge of 
legality, it is worth returning to the dawn of the computer age, when the 
hacker ethic emerged with a distinctly anti-authoritarianism view of 
technology.15 In the early 1960s, student programmers at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) developed a unique culture hailing the 
virtues of access to computer technology and freedom of information.16 
These early hackers believed deeply in their ability to improve life through 
computer technology, and they resented barriers and bureaucracies that 
hindered their hands-on exploration and betterment of the world around 
them.17 
This mentality led to a veneration of decentralized experimentation 
and a certain willful blindness to what hackers saw as inefficient 
restrictions.18 Ever mischievous, they probed flaws in MIT’s phone system, 
ignored prohibitions on tampering with computer hardware, and 
intentionally crashed the school’s million-dollar mainframe computers (to 
which they were allowed only limited access).19 Adopting a unique concept 
of property rights, they would break into university labs to “borrow” 
components without ever considering it stealing, but would share their own 
 
not care. This Article attempts to answer not only that question but also the (easier) question 
of what happens to a merchant who knows and does care that his wares facilitate crimes. 
15 See generally, STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS (2010) (tracing the history of the hacker ethic). 
16 See id. at 27. 
17 Id. at 28–31. These early hackers were, in many ways, like the early radio enthusiasts, 
who were comprised largely of tinkerers and hobbyists working without expectation of 
cashing in. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
276 (2010) (observing that the homebrew computer hobbyists in California from which 
Steve Wozniak emerged “were the exact counterparts of the radio pioneers of the 1910s—
hobbyists–idealists who loved to play with technology and dreamed it could make the world 
a better place”). 
18 LEVY, supra note 15, at 28–119 (explaining at length the history of hackers’ 
decentralized experimentation).  
19 Id. at 40–41, 88–89, 119. 
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software creations without thought to passwords, royalties, or licenses, 
repeating the mantra that “information should be free.”20 
As the computer revolution spread, so did the hacker ethic. Soon 
California computer enthusiasts, buoyed by an undercurrent of post-hippie 
activism, brought computers to the people by hacking hardware and sharing 
even proprietary software, like Atari’s Pong.21 As the market for personal 
computers grew, some programmers, like Bill Gates, were willing to profit 
from their creations.22 Combined with this entrepreneurial spirit, the hacker 
ethic was eventually credited as inspiring the minds behind titans of the 
tech industry such as Microsoft, Google, and Facebook.23 
The antiestablishment attitude persisted, too. For some, this outlook 
led to noble pursuits, leading them to forgo profiting on their achievements 
to innovate in the public interest. A good example is the early Internet 
pioneers protecting the nascent network against outside control by 
championing governance by consensus.24 David Clark, the Internet’s chief 
protocol architect for most of the 1980s, memorably remarked, “We reject: 
kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running 
code.”25 But this mentality also begot a certain lawlessness that would land 
 
20 Id. at 28, 46, 95–96, 98. Levy describes how some hackers went as far as taking 
correspondence courses in locksmithing to get special restricted blank keys or learned to 
duplicate high-security keys. Id. at 96. See generally THEODORE T. TOOL (A.K.A. TED THE 
TOOL), MIT GUIDE TO LOCK PICKING (1991), available at http://www.lysator.liu.se/mit-
guide/MITLockGuide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WS85-VZ4N. 
21 LEVY, supra note 15, at 219, 227.  
22 LEVY, supra note 15, at 232–33 (describing Gates’s strident criticism of hack 
“sharing” culture); id. at 466 (noting that Gates and others involved in the early days of the 
computer revolution became “rich, famous, and powerful . . . even if it meant in some ways 
veering from the Hacker True Way”). 
23 In an afterword in the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Steven Levy’s Hackers, the 
author discusses how “the hacker mentality has been incorporated as a value” at Google, and 
how Ben Fried, Google’s Chief Information Officer, showed him a dog-eared copy of his 
book and told him he “wouldn’t be here today” if not for reading it. Id. at 464, 474. Levy 
also remarked that Bill Gates’s “faith in hacking underscored all of his work, right down to 
his staffing decisions.” Id. at 467. Finally, in an interview with Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg, Zuckerberg told Levy that he wants his company “to be the place where the best 
hackers want to work.” Id. at 475–76; see also Steven Levy, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook 
Home, Money, and the Future of Communication, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://
www.wired.com/magazine/2013/04/facebookqa/, archived at http://perma.cc/X62B-6C8W.  
24 DAVID G. POST does a good job of capturing the spirit of consensus that went into 
developing the early Internet in IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 126–62 (2009). Another example is Richard Stallman’s fervent evangelism of 
open-source software. See LEVY, supra note 15, at 450, 461. 
25 Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works, WIRED (Oct. 1995), http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/3.10/ietf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/45BP-KHQW. 
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next-generation hackers in court. It is under a general banner of hackerism, 
for example, that the online collective Anonymous carries out devastating 
cyber-attacks.26 Other hacker progenies, info-libertarians like Aaron Swartz 
and Chelsea (Bradley) Manning, raised the ire of law enforcement by 
pushing the boundaries of “information should be free.”27 Eventually, the 
term “hacker” was marred with the connotation of “digital trespasser.”28 
This history showcases a key difficulty that courts must address: as a 
rule, technology is “dual use,” deployable for both nefarious and virtuous 
ends. This tension is perhaps best exemplified by the Internet itself. Its 
benefits are clear: it enables anonymous speech, creativity, and encrypted 
digital communication, among many other things. But as noted by Nate 
Anderson, a chronicler of Internet crime, the “productive chaos” of the 
Internet that makes these benefits possible also “makes all sorts of 
 
26 Martin & Newhall, supra note 7, at 134–35 n.158 (chronicling the origins and history 
of Anonymous). 
27 Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years for leaking classified documents to 
WikiLeaks. Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a 
Pivotal Leak of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A1. Online chat logs received that 
she spoke of doing so because “information should be free.” Evan Hansen, Manning–Lamo 
Chat Logs Revealed, WIRED (July 13, 2011, 3:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2011/07/manning-lamo-logs/, archived at http://perma.cc/QK9Z-Z5PA. Swartz committed 
suicide after his arrest and prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for using a 
computer program to download academic articles from the online repository JSTOR, which 
prosecutors alleged he intended to distribute. Noam Cohen, A Data Crusader, a Defendant 
and Now, a Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2013, at A1; Elizabeth Day, Aaron Swartz: Hacker, 
Genius . . . Martyr?, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2013/jun/02/aaron-swartz-hacker-genius-martyr-girlfriend-interview, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HX9C-FEAF. The controversy surrounding both of these situations 
underscores the often fine line between the hacker ethic and a crime. 
28 LEVY, supra note 15, at 456. Merriam-Webster today defines “hacker” alternatively as 
“an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer” or “a person who 
illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers with information in a computer system.” 
Hacker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/hacker (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CC86-DWWB. 
Some people in the current MIT community dispute the use of the term “hacker” as applying 
to people who break into computer systems, preferring to call these people “crackers.” This 
group defines “hacker” as “someone who does some sort of interesting and creative work at 
a high intensity level,” including “writing computer programs” but also “pulling a clever 
prank that amuses and delights everyone on campus.” See Frequently Asked Questions, 
INTERESTING HACKS TO FASCINATE PEOPLE: THE MIT GALLERY OF HACKS, 
http://hacks.mit.edu/misc/faq.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
C73D-XTHK. The hacker ethic has also spilled into the purview of crimes regarding non-
digital technology: a recent article in Wired Magazine questioned the conviction of Alfred 
Anaya, a master technician of secret compartments in cars, for conspiracy in drug crimes, 
suggesting that Anaya’s calculated blindness to his compartments’ uses should have 
absolved him. Koerner, supra note 5. 
102 BENTON MARTIN & JEREMIAH NEWHALL [Vol. 105 
 
unproductive chaos not just possible but unavoidable.”29 Thus, for the better 
part of two decades, courts and legislatures have been attempting to strike 
the proper balance between productive and unproductive chaos. 
Before turning to how criminal law plays into this balance, it is worth 
mentioning that there was once a serious debate about whether government 
should regulate the Internet at all.30 In the 1990s, staunch defenders of 
Internet freedom contended that governments should avoid the temptation 
of trying to prevent local harm by imposing rules on the digital realm. In an 
influential article, professors David Johnson and David Post argued that the 
Internet, with its disregard for “geographical boundaries,” had thrown “the 
law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become 
the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by 
any current territorially based sovereign.”31 
By the late 2000s, however, as citizens moved more of their lives into 
the digital world, the case for government intervention grew stronger. In 
2006, professors Tim Wu and Jack Goldsmith predicted in their book Who 
Controls the Internet? that borderless-Internet advocates had overlooked 
the extent to which the success of the Internet hinged “on something 
invisible but essential: public goods like criminal law, property rights, and 
contract enforcement provided by government.”32 Reflecting on these 
 
29 NATE ANDERSON, THE INTERNET POLICE: HOW CRIME WENT ONLINE, AND THE COPS 
FOLLOWED 243–44 (2013). 
30 One of the most prominent of the early debates was about how much Congress could 
regulate Internet pornography to protect minors. Congress initially tried to impose criminal 
sanctions on anyone who transmitted “obscene or indecent” materials to people under the 
age of eighteen. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 
Stat. 133, 133–36, part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56. In 1997, the Supreme Court concluded that the Communications Decency Act 
violated the First Amendment. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).  
31 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996). This view of the Internet was not merely an academic 
utopia. Johnson and Post’s argument foresaw the creation of private Internet governing 
bodies, like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, to which the United 
States ceded control of the Domain Name System in 1998. MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INTERNET 
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/about/
agreements/mou-jpa/icann-mou-25nov98-en.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DLP6-ZG82?type=source. This view was also echoed by the Supreme Court, 
which affirmed the Third Circuit’s rejection of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 
an early attempt at Internet censorship, and explained that this “unique medium” known as 
“cyberspace” is “located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, 
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
32 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 140 (2006).  
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thoughts in 2010, Wu summarized why he and Goldsmith were so confident 
that the Internet would succumb to regulation: 
Despite its virtual qualities, behind the concept of a global network were 
living human beings, blood and flesh. The human body’s susceptibility to 
pain and imprisonment is a large part of what the nation–state bases its rule 
on, and that had not changed. We predicted that the nation’s threat of 
physical force, otherwise known as laws, would therefore shape the Network 
as much as its founding ambitions.33 
II. THE LIMITS OF NEUTRALITY 
The government’s ability to control the “flesh and blood” underlying 
the Internet is core to this Article. Although hackers regard laws regulating 
the Internet as an anathema, their careless disregard for the intersection of 
evolving and traditional legal limits could land some of our brightest minds 
in jail.34 
At the same time, Internet crime is a very real threat, and creative 
anarchy offers scarce protection to the public against the grave danger from 
those who would do harm with the “neutral” tools developed by those same 
“brightest minds.” The United States remains resolved to protect its citizens 
from online crime. President Obama, for example, in his 2013 State of the 
Union address, warned that the country must “face the rapidly growing 
threat from cyber-attacks,” lest the nation “look back years from now and 
wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and 
our economy.”35 
 
33 Tim Wu, Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead?, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 179, 181 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010). For 
another thoughtful discussion of this topic, see Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A 
Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365, 366 (2009) 
(“The dilemma that online law-breakers face is that their cyberspace crimes have real-life 
motives and fulfill real-life needs.”). 
34 For example, consider a recent profile of the late Steve Jobs and his potential violation 
of various white-collar criminal laws, in which the author warns that “Jobs’s conduct is a 
reminder that the difference between genius and potentially criminal behavior can be a fine 
line.” James B. Stewart, Defying Convention and Maybe the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2014, 
at B1. 
35 113 CONG. REC. H443–44 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2013) (remarks by President Obama in 
the State of the Union Address). Obama stated: 
America must also face the rapidly growing threat from cyber-attacks. (Applause.) Now, we 
know hackers steal people’s identities and infiltrate private emails. We know foreign countries 
and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to 
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air traffic control systems. We cannot 
look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our 
security and our economy. 
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At the periphery of this brewing war between law enforcement and 
those who would use the Internet to do harm sit the “neutral” hackers and 
innovators. They wish to innovate, to create, and to invent—they do not 
want to takes sides in a struggle to regulate the Internet and enforce the law. 
Yet as discussed in this Part, technologists cannot sit idly while their 
technologies find criminal use, as the very act of not intervening pushes 
them closer to criminal culpability. 
A. THE LEGAL AND MORAL AMBIGUITY OF INTERNET 
CRIME 
In the wake of such dire threats from Internet crime, all of the 
foregoing discussion of the “Hacker Ethic” and the insistence on 
“neutrality” by avowed (albeit petty) criminals at such privileged havens as 
MIT sounds a bit bloodless. These self-dubbed “hackers,” insisting on the 
neutrality of computer codes that can crash a power grid, echo the 
Holmesian bad man, who cares nothing for morality, but only for what the 
law prohibits.36 For while most understand the need to deter the Holmesian 
bad man, few have any sympathy for him.37 
Not all computer crime, however, lines up neatly with our moral 
compass. The same person who would circle back to the drive-through after 
receiving too much change may think nothing of uploading a copyrighted 
song.38 The moral line demarcating taking someone else’s money shines 
 
Id.  
36 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
Holmes stated: 
[A] bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public 
force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and 
law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his 
neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will 
want to keep out of jail if he can. 
Id. 
37 Consider that, in 2013, a Pew Research Center Study showed that the group Internet 
and smartphone users most wanted to avoid tracking their online activity was “hackers” and 
“criminals,” which beat out advertisers, harassing individuals, employers, and law 
enforcement. Lee Rainie, et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Sept. 5, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Anonymity-online.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S3TN-4U7W. 
38 Consider the anecdote about a young woman promised by a mysterious stranger that if 
she pushes a button she will receive $50,000, but that when she does, some person whom she 
has never known will be killed. See Richard Matheson, Button, Button, PLAYBOY, June 1970, 
at 131, 132 [hereinafter Button 1970]; see also The Twilight Zone: Button, Button (CBS 
television broadcast Mar. 7, 1986) [hereinafter Button 1986] (upping the ante to $200,000). 
The woman, desperate for money, succumbs and pushes the button, unable to care enough 
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bright, but the moral division between copying a short story published in 
1922 and one published in 1923 remains evasive.39 But practical necessity 
requires the law to draw lines that morality does not.40 That is why, 
although the morality of sports gambling or prostitution may not shift with 
state lines, the legality of each does. These arbitrary lines become even 
more difficult to follow because of the complexity in determining 
jurisdiction in regard to business conducted via the Internet.41 The most 
punctilious of technologists42 would have difficulty knowing if, for 
example, his software to support online gambling were legal.43 
So legal and moral ambiguities abound online, and not only for 
adherents to an anarchist Hacker creed, but for well-meaning technologists 
 
for someone she will never know to refrain from causing their death. The televised version 
has the better ending: the stranger who brought the button pays the woman her blood money 
and then, as he leaves, promises that the next person who receives the button (and a similar 
offer) will be someone that the woman has never met. See Button 1986, supra. The tale 
wryly demonstrates the weak pull of human empathy when victim and victimizer remain 
anonymous to one another, even for victims of the most serious crimes. Internet criminals 
often never meet their victims (unless caught); they need only push a button.  
39 See Societe Civile Succession Guino v. Renoir, 549 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The court noted:  
The year 1923 is significant because the 1976 Act, which became effective on January 1, 1978, 
and the 1998 Copyright Extension Act, operate together to create a bright line rule for which 
works are now in the public domain: works published before January 1, 1923, are generally in 
the public domain. 
Id. 
40 There is, of course, substantial scholarship on the relationship between morality and 
criminal regulation. For a critical discussion of modern views on the topic, see William J. 
Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2000). 
41 See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 
796, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning whether a website’s interactivity can bestow 
jurisdiction); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–25 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997) (creating test to determine jurisdiction over business conducted exclusively via 
Internet). 
42 What we might term the “Holmesian hacker” (after Holmes’s bad man) or the “lawful 
neutral” hacker. See MIKE MCARTOR & F. WESLEY SCHNEIDER, COMPLETE SCOUNDREL: A 
PLAYER’S GUIDE TO TRICKERY AND INGENUITY 8–9 (2007) (explaining the concept of “lawful 
neutral” character alignment for Advanced Dungeons and Dragons edition 3.5).  
43 Consider the case against programmer Robert Stuart. In 2012, Stuart was indicted in 
New York for violating a state law against promoting gambling because his company sells 
online-sportsbook software. The software was licensed to companies who in turn licensed it 
to other companies for use in jurisdictions where sports gambling is legal, and Stuart swore 
himself that he never accepted any illegal bets at all, but New York State prosecuted him 
nonetheless after he refused to assist them by installing a “backdoor” in his software. See 
Kim Zetter, Write Gambling Software, Go to Prison, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2013, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/coder-charged-for-gambling-software/all/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A9ZV-VVV3. 
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as well. When ambiguity allows the laws to sweep too broadly, they 
ensnare even those who meant to tread carefully within the lines of both law 
and morality. 
Legal ambiguity also comes with an economic cost to society. A chief 
goal of criminal punishment is deterrence, but when the limits of forbidden 
conduct are unclear, the law deters too much, hobbling innovation that 
would be not only legal, but desirable.44 Just as unclear rules for intellectual 
property stifle innovation,45 so too an ambiguous line between guilt and 
innocence in aiding and abetting Internet crimes chills those who might 
otherwise have created the next Google or eBay. 
This legal ambiguity reaches its height when deciding whether to 
prosecute creators of “dual use” technologies, by which we mean those 
inventions or services which may be used for good or ill. It is easy to decide 
the culpability of a “black hat” hacker who crashes a power grid, but harder 
to decide whether the creator of the program he used should share in that 
culpability. Yet the trend of pursuing the abettors of Internet criminals—
sometimes in lieu of the principals—is in many ways unsurprising.46 The 
sources of illegal goods are often located abroad or hidden through 
anonymizing software, so the government aims its enforcement efforts at 
intermediaries within (or arguably within) its jurisdiction.47 The choice of 
criminal process is also predictable, for criminal law bestows sweeping 
powers on the federal prosecutor. In taking on file-sharing services, for 
instance, prosecutors have seized domain names, recorded internal 
computer conversations, sought extradition of overseas defendants, and 
wiped out data from innocent third parties as collateral damage.48 
For technologists who see their role as neutral and insulated from their 
users’ criminal activity, discerning the uncertain and shifting line between 
bystander and accomplice is paramount. But it is a line that exists inside the 
mind of the accused—the acts themselves are lawful. The would-be law-
abider has no bright line to tell him when a legal act becomes a crime, and 
 
44 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 210 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) 
(“Courts must balance the risk of over-deterrence against the public interest in deterrence of 
unlawful conduct.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
45 See Benton C. Martin, Comment, The American Models of Technology Transfer: 
Contextualized Emulation by Developing Countries?, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 101, 126 
(2009) (discussing how overbroad patent protection stifles innovation with the threat of legal 
consequences).  
46 For examples, see infra Part IV. 
47 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 32, at 68–77 (discussing how governments try to 
exert control over the Internet through local intermediaries). 
48 Martin & Newhall, supra note 7, at 144–51. 
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the prosecutor and jury often have only circumstantial evidence of the 
accused’s intent or desire. 
This is not a new problem, but one that the Internet has amplified. 
Over a century ago, each act committed by Dr. Mudd was ostensibly 
legal—even admirable—but it was the jury’s belief in his guilty mind that 
condemned him. Today, the Internet exponentially multiplies the number of 
people that technologists may aid, and drapes their interactions with a layer 
of anonymity. Doctor Mudd aided a single man, but a “black hat” hacker 
can provide computer code for a virus or worm to thousands of people in 
dozens of countries without ever seeing their faces or knowing their names. 
Inventing a computer virus is no more a crime than setting a leg, yet when 
created with the intent to aid others in infecting computers, it is a federal 
offense.49 
With Internet crime, therefore, society faces a peculiar difficulty in 
deterring the “bad man” when the same act may be legal one moment and 
illegal the next, all depending on what was in his mind. Of course, this 
problem is not peculiar to Internet crime, as shown by the Mudd anecdote 
discussed earlier, but the peculiar ambiguities of the Internet, with its 
blurred jurisdictional lines and sometimes arbitrary distinctions between 
crime and commerce, have muddied the mens rea requirement. These 
“thought crimes”—legal acts with an illegal mental state—have proved an 
enduring puzzle for the judiciary, but are essential to understanding the 
culpability of today’s technologists.50 
B. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF “THOUGHT CRIMES” 
In the taxonomy of crime, “thought crimes” consist of three phyla: 
attempt, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. The second on this list, aiding 
and abetting, provides the most vexing problems for technologists and is the 
chief concern of this Article. But understanding why proof of intent to “aid 
and abet” should be such an intractable problem requires understanding the 
other “thought crimes” as well. 
 
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
50 The term “thought crime” is used here without the derision sometimes aimed at the 
idea of punishing the guilty mind. It is entirely natural that an act may be criminal or 
innocent depending on its perpetrator’s intent. As Holmes put it: “[E]ven a dog distinguishes 
between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press, 1963) (1881). So, too, 
premeditated killing may be self-defense or it may be murder, and it all hangs on the 
defendant’s desires. Moreover, the requirement of a guilty mind operates to restrict, rather 
than enlarge, the criminal law, by placing a high hurdle of proof before the prosecution. The 
difficulty for courts lies in how the government clears that hurdle. 
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Certainly thought alone, without action, cannot be criminal. But these 
three crimes are unique because the forbidden conduct is both incomplete 
and undefined—the criminal does not actually steal, for example, but 
conspires to steal, or aids someone who stole, or attempts to steal. Other 
crimes are defined as much by intent (mens rea), as by the completed act 
(actus reus). The “thought crimes,” however, embrace an amorphous cloud 
of actus reus, a category of conduct too broad for definition. So long as the 
accused acts with the forbidden desires to conspire, to aid and abet, or to 
attempt, he is guilty whatever he does, however innocuous. 
Consider a client with a mental defect that constantly causes him to 
desire to commit crimes. The client is conscious of the defect and able to 
change his behavior, but not his underlying desire. For most crimes, the 
advice to the client is to refrain from certain acts: he can never be convicted 
of murder if he does not cause a death; never convicted of robbery if he 
does not take someone else’s property. But the thought crimes vex this 
client and his lawyer. Because of his guilty mind, he may be convicted of 
attempted murder even if no one dies; convicted of aiding and abetting 
robbery even if he never takes another’s property.51 This is because any 
“substantial” act, combined with a guilty mind, will complete the crimes of 
attempt or of aiding and abetting. The list of such acts is infinite; the client 
cannot be advised to avoid them all.52 Of course there exists an infinite 
variety of ways to murder, but all of them share the definitive characteristic 
of the death of a human being. “Substantial” acts for conviction under 
attempt or under aiding and abetting have no such limiting principle. The 
problem is not their multiplicity but their amorphousness; they are defined 
by the criminal mens rea and nothing else. The guilty mind condemns our 
hypothetical client before he starts. 
First and foremost of the three “thought crimes” is the crime of 
attempt, which couples most any act with a guilty mind. Attempt requires 
an intent to commit the crime attempted and a “substantial step,” although 
the step itself may be an innocuous act. (Attempt’s cousins are those crimes 
which couple a specific act with an intent to commit a further act—most 
commonly, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.) 
 
51 He may, however, avoid conviction for conspiracy so long as he resolves to disagree 
with everyone he meets. But the distinction between thought and agreement is slight, 
particularly when agreement may be implied from other (noncriminal) acts. 
52 The existence of “insubstantial” acts does not render the number of “substantial” acts 
finite. An infinite set of numbers may be divided into subsets that retain the infinite 
characteristic, e.g., an infinite set of odd numbers and an infinite set of even numbers. So, 
too, infinite acts may be divided into endless subsets of “substantial” and “insubstantial” 
acts. 
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Even very dangerous acts may be legal with proper intent. For example, 
consider the facts of United States v. Olsen, in which Olsen was convicted 
of developing a biological agent to use as a weapon after admitting he 
produced ricin.53 Ricin is a deadly toxin derived from the humble castor 
bean. Possession of ricin is illegal if the possessor has an intent to use ricin 
“as a weapon,” or if possessed in “a quantity” inconsistent with peaceful 
purposes.54 A person who possessed a very small amount of ricin, 
developed, as Olsen claimed, out of a morbid curiosity—i.e., to see whether 
he really could make castor beans into poison—would not be guilty under 
this statute.55 
Second, under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a person is punishable as a principal if 
the person “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the 
offense or “willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed 
by him or another would be an offense against the United States.”56 Section 
2 applies to all federal crimes,57 and we refer to this section with the 
familiar moniker of “aiding and abetting.” This provision will be the main 
focus of later Parts of this Article. 
Third, the crime of conspiracy to commit an offense is complete upon 
an agreement to commit an offense and the commission of some act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy—it is the crime of attempt by team-up.58 Like 
§ 2’s prohibition on aiding and abetting, § 371 applies to conspiracies to 
commit any other federal crime.59 But the requirement of an agreement 
dispels much (though not all) of the ambiguity hinted at earlier (and 
detailed below). To commit conspiracy, the conspirators must give voice to 
their intent by expressing their agreement with one another, and, in giving 
voice to their intent, they provide proof of their guilty minds.60 
 
53 See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc).  
54 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2012). The Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional the 
application of another statute barring essentially the same activity, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2012), 
in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). But possession of ricin out of 
“morbid curiosity” would also not be a crime under § 229, even though that section on its 
face forbids possession of a chemical weapon (including ricin) for any purpose, because the 
definition of a “chemical weapon” excludes any chemical possessed for a “peaceful 
purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 229F. 
55 See Olsen, 737 F.3d at 629–30 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). This Article returns to this example in its second half. 
56 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
57 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949). 
58 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
59 Id. 
60 Not every conspiracy will be so clear-cut. Consider the case of Alfred Anaya, who 
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Ostensibly, it should make little difference whether to charge the 
defendant as a conspirator or an abettor, because both are punished for even 
a minor role in the crime. The prosecution will often have its choice of how 
to charge a defendant (and for this reason may charge in the alternative), 
because the same conduct can make an accused a conspirator with a minor 
role or an abettor.61 Consider what would be required for an exception—
providing help to the principal without ever reaching an agreement. For 
example, if a person saw notorious bank robber John Dillinger in the act of 
robbing a bank and, hoping to aid him, tripped the security guard, that 
person would have committed aiding and abetting (because she acted with 
intent to help Dillinger commit a crime) but not conspiracy (because she 
had no agreement with Dillinger).62 
Two important distinctions make the difference between conspiracy 
and aiding and abetting vital to prosecutors and defense attorneys. First, by 
a quirk of the hearsay rules, statements of a coconspirator are an exception 
to the hearsay rule, while statements of an abettor are not.63 Second, the 
Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States held that every member of a 
conspiracy may be punished for the crimes of just one coconspirator, if the 
crime was reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.64 This rule of liability is inapplicable to aiders and abettors who, 
 
never expressly agreed to help anyone distribute narcotics. Koerner, supra note 5. Anaya’s 
business was putting secret compartments into cars; the government charged that Anaya 
should have known that these compartments could have had but one purpose, and by 
providing these compartments he joined the conspiracy to distribute the narcotics squirreled 
therein. Id. 
61 See United States v. Ailsworth, 867 F. Supp. 980, 987 (D. Kan. 1994). 
62 “‘There is no requirement that there be an agreement in order to convict of aiding and 
abetting. Conspiracy to commit a crime and aiding and abetting in its commission are 
distinct offenses.’” United States v. Palazzolo, 71 F.3d 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
United States v. Frazier, 880 F.2d 878, 886 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
63 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
64 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). The Pinkerton rule has faced 
opposition, and has decreased in use in recent years, because of due-process concerns arising 
when the conspirator and the crime are especially attenuated. Wayne R. LaFave described 
this opposition in Substantive Criminal Law:  
Although the Pinkerton rule never gained broad acceptance, the opposition to it has grown 
significantly in recent years. It was rejected by the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code and of the 
proposed new federal criminal code. Most of the state statutes on accomplice liability require 
more than membership in the conspiracy, and the language in these statutes has been relied upon 
by courts in rejecting the conclusion that complicity is coextensive with conspiracy. The rule 
continues to exist in the federal system, though the courts “are mindful of the potential due 
process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships between 
the conspirator and the substantive crime.” The same may be said of at least some of the states 
which still utilize the Pinkerton principle.  
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while liable for the crimes they aid to the same extent as the principal, are 
not liable for all of the principal’s other crimes. These are a few of the 
advantages that make conspiracy charges, in the words of Learned Hand, 
the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”65 
Yet the government has much to gain by jettisoning a conspiracy 
charge in favor of charging aiding and abetting under § 2. The prosecution 
loses a hearsay exception66 but no longer must prove an agreement.67 To 
charge technology providers with reaching an agreement with anonymous 
clients scattered across our globe would be difficult, which makes aiding 
and abetting a better fit for these prosecutions. But with no express 
agreement, we come to the root of the dangerous ambiguity in the criminal 
law: how to know the defendant’s mind. 
C. PROOF OF “THOUGHT CRIMES” BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
Absent a confession, jurors and judges must decide the contents of a 
defendant's mind by circumstantial evidence. Occasionally, however, 
prosecutors discover nearly direct evidence of a defendant’s mind, as with a 
diary or journal.  
For an example of nearly direct evidence of intent, consider United 
States v. Olsen, wherein Olsen claimed that he converted castor beans into 
ricin out of idle (though dark) curiosity, and not for use as a weapon.68 If 
 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.3(a) (2d ed. 2003) (footnotes 
omitted).  
65 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.) For one circuit 
judge’s paean to the broad reach of conspiracy laws, see United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 
104, 146 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Over the course of the modern legal era, the pursuit of federal 
conspiracy convictions has doubtlessly been a boon to United States Attorneys.”). 
66 Actually, to the chagrin of defense attorneys across the country, the government may 
still claim the hearsay exception as it applies even to unindicted conspirators. 
67 Not having to prove an agreement can make a critical difference. As just one example, 
defendant Herbert Phipps challenged his conviction for conspiracy to contribute drugs on the 
grounds that he never agreed to join the drug ring; he was only a dealer. United States v. 
Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 2012). The Seventh Circuit explained that selling was 
enough for aiding and abetting but not conspiracy:  
“[K]nowledge of a buyer’s intention to commit a crime with a supplier’s goods doesn’t imply an 
agreement between the buyer and the seller that the buyer do so. That knowledge, coupled with 
the supplier’s having supplied the buyer with the means (in this case a supply of drugs) of 
committing the illegal act of retailing an illegal drug, could make him an aider and abettor of the 
buyer’s crime but not, without more, a conspirator with the buyer.” 
Id. 
68 See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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that was true, then he was innocent, and so the government faced the 
challenge of proving what was in Olsen’s head.69 To do so, the government 
built a case on something very close to Olsen’s actual thoughts—his Google 
searches. Olsen Googled such phrases on “undetectable poisons” and 
“untraceable death pill” (ricin is virtually undetectable in an autopsy).70 
Such a history comes close to showing Olsen’s own thoughts—and 
suggests something very different than had he Googled “is ricin safe” or 
“how to do home experiments with ricin without hurting anyone.” 
Moreover, given the scant uses to which ricin could be put other than 
homicide, Olsen’s conviction is hardly a surprise. “Morbid curiosity” is not 
a substantial use for a deadly, undetectable, and banned poison, so the jury 
was not unreasonable when it inferred that Olsen’s true intent was more 
nefarious. 
With aiding and abetting, as with attempt, the ultimate evidence of 
guilt or innocence will be locked inside the defendant’s mind, the one place 
where the government cannot place a wire, send a confidential informant, or 
recruit a cooperating witness. That is the battleground for trial, and likewise 
it is rightly the focus of challenges to sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 
It is a rare case in which the defendants have made express their desire to 
violate the law, although it is somewhat more likely in cases of conspiracy, 
because remember that crime requires an agreement to commit another 
crime.71 Because intent, or desire, which is sometimes called “specific 
intent,” can usually be shown only by inference, prosecutors ask the jury to 
infer intent from circumstantial evidence of the abettor’s acts and his 
knowledge of the actions of others. 
III. SHIFTING DEFINITIONS OF THE GUILTY MIND OF AIDERS AND 
ABETTORS 
Because of the flexibility required in aiding-and-abetting cases, writing 
an all-encompassing set of rules for courts to apply to aiding-and-abetting 
law would be a bootless errand. This Part attempts a more modest goal: an 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 629; United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1186 (9th Cir. 2013). 
71 For example, in a memorable scene from The Informant, a confidential informant for 
the FBI prodded several corporate executives, who were reaching a tacit but unspoken 
agreement to illegally fix lysine prices, into making their agreement explicit while they were 
being secretly videotaped. The informant feigns misunderstanding, asking: “What are we 
doing here?” He then leads the group in saying, in unison, that “we are all agreeing” to fix 
the price of lysine. See THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. 2009); see also KURT EICHENWALD, 
THE INFORMANT (2000). But because aiding and abetting does not require agreement, such 
smoking gun evidence of desire to aid the crime is rare. 
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analysis that describes what courts are doing by revealing a logical through-
line connecting seemingly inconsistent decisions about aiding and abetting. 
Any common thread also serves as a predictive rule, foreshadowing how 
courts will apply the law of aiding and abetting to future technologies. 
This Article does not seek to champion new normative rules for courts 
or legislatures to adopt. A court could adopt the “substantial unoffending 
uses” analysis proposed, but this Article’s thesis is that such an adoption 
would be a cosmetic change rather than a substantive one. When legal 
scholars don their practitioner hats, they routinely predict for clients how a 
court will apply existing law to new facts. This Article provides a tool for 
that analysis, one that jives more consistently with the varied rulings than 
the partial and conflicting rationales espoused in legal opinions. Like 
pornography, courts know aiding and abetting “when [they] see it,”72 as 
showcased by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rosemond.73 This 
Article’s “substantial unoffending uses” analysis describes what courts are 
seeing. 
A. BACKGROUND ON AIDING AND ABETTING 
It was only around the turn of the twentieth century that the law of 
aiding and abetting in the United States evolved to, as a rule, punish 
accessories as principals.74 Before that time, the common law made fine 
distinctions between principals and accessories in felony cases (largely 
because, at one time, all felony offenders faced the death penalty, from 
which courts wished to shield accessories).75 But as the Supreme Court 
explained when reviewing this history, in the painstaking process of 
defining these distinctions, “justice all too frequently was defeated.”76 If, for 
instance, the proceedings against the principal somehow faltered—say, the 
principal died or remained on the lam—the accessory escaped conviction as 
well.77 Therefore, a reform movement mounted, and first England’s 
Parliament, then state legislatures in the United States, and eventually the 
federal government, replaced judge-made law with statutes designed to 
 
72 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
73 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249 n.8 (2014). See infra notes 138–146 
and accompanying text. 
74 Congress enacted penal codes to this effect in 1899 for Alaska and in 1901 for the 
District of Columbia; Section 2 was enacted in 1909. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 
10, 16–18 (1980). 
75 Id. at 15; see Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 
223 (2000). 
76 Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16. 
77 Id. at 19–20 (discussing the House and Senate Committee Reports related to § 2). 
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punish accessories as principals.78 The statutory language drafted at that 
time remains in effect today in the form of § 2(a).79 
This rule finds its easiest application when there is clear evidence of a 
desire to assist in committing the underlying act. Absent an admission, 
however, proving desire to further criminal activity is a difficult endeavor, 
as illustrated by Dr. Mudd’s assistance of John Wilkes Booth. Mudd’s 
facially innocent acts transform once it is revealed that Booth met with 
Mudd before the assassination, that he stored supplies in Mudd’s house, and 
that both Mudd and Booth were staunch supporters of the Confederacy; 
facts confirmed by another one of Booth’s admitted conspirators.80 The 
jury’s decision to convict Dr. Mudd seems less mysterious in light of these 
facts, but Mudd never confessed, and some historians still believe in his 
innocence.81 In Dr. Mudd’s case, as in so many others, courts and juries are 
often asked to infer intent from evidence showing how much the accused 
knew about or assisted the criminal enterprise. 
In making such inferences, courts draw on Judge Learned Hand’s 
analysis from more than seventy-five years ago in United States v. Peoni,82 
which the Supreme Court adopted in 1949 in Nye & Nissen v. United 
States,83 and reaffirmed in 2014 in Rosemond.84 Peoni, a counterfeiter, put 
fake bills into circulation, and they passed through an intermediary to 
Dorsey, who was charged with possessing them. Peoni was charged as 
 
78 Id. at 16–18. 
79 The statute was originally identified in 1909 as 18 U.S.C. § 550, which became § 2(a) 
in 1948. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012) (based on 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1909)). At the same time, § 2(b) 
was added to punish “causers,” defined as “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done 
which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, 
is punishable as a principal.” See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE 9: U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, § 2472, available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02472.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
G8NE-6JC2. This Article will not directly address this section, which has prompted its own 
body of case law, see, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), because the authors 
consider subsection (b) less likely than subsection (a) to be used against “dual use” 
technologies. 
80 See LIFE OF MUDD, supra note 1, at 66–84 (arguments by Dr. Mudd’s defense attorney 
about evidence of Mudd’s and Booth’s acquaintance). 
81 See, e.g., Frank J. Williams, The Lincoln Assassination in Law and Lore, in THE 
LINCOLN ASSASSINATION 137, 140 (Harold Holzer et al. eds., 2010). The Michigan 
legislature, at the urging of Dr. Mudd’s grandson, passed a resolution declaring that 
“[h]istory has subsequently revealed” that Dr. Mudd was an innocent victim. Id. 
82 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
83 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949). 
84 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014) (referring to the Peoni 
standard as the “canonical formulation of [the] needed state of mind” for aiding and abetting 
liability). 
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Dorsey’s accessory, but the conviction did not stand. Judge Hand concluded 
that to be guilty as an accessory, a defendant must “in some sort associate 
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he 
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.”85 He 
added that the words used to describe accomplice liability—“even the most 
colorless, ‘abet’—carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.”86 
Under this rubric, the Second Circuit concluded Peoni could not be 
considered an accessory to Dorsey’s crime because his connection to the 
endeavor ended once he was paid by the intermediary.87 
The crux of the problem that Learned Hand squashed in Peoni was 
double-counting. When a transaction is the crime, whether that be passing 
counterfeit dollars or selling drugs, deeming buyer and seller as 
accomplices doubles their liability and, more crucially, destroys any 
difference in culpability.88 If each side of a transaction is an accomplice to 
the other, and is thus punishable as principal, then junkie and juicer alike 
must answer for both the purchase and the sale. Congress did not intend for 
that type of twofold liability, which in essence eliminates different levels of 
culpability for the different sides of various transactional crimes.89 Of 
course, not every drug buyer is a junkie; one dealer may sell to another, as a 
wholesaler to a retailer. But the punishments for quantity of drugs sold or 
possessed presume resale, for that is the justification for their enhanced 
penalty. Making every wholesaler an accomplice to every future sale would 
also be double-counting. 
 
85 Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 402–03. 
88 The transactional crimes at issue are sometimes dubbed “victimless” crimes, but only 
because the direct victims are themselves culpable. Compare pimps, illicit croupiers, drug 
dealers on the one hand with prostitutes, gamblers, and addicts on the other. Whether the 
crime is pimping, gambling, or drug sales, it takes two to tango—the crime cannot be 
complete without both parties. A robbery is not complete without a victim, yet of course the 
victim does not abet her own mugging. Drug addicts are not as blameless as the victim of a 
robbery, but they are less culpable than their dealers. For that reason, Congress enacted 
different penalties for the mere possession of drugs, without intent to distribute (i.e., an 
addict’s crime), than for the distribution of drugs (i.e., a dealer’s crime). 
89 See United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1977). The court stated: 
We must reject the government’s suggestion at oral argument that in such a case the principal 
would nevertheless be liable as an aider and abettor of the agent’s distribution to him, since this 
would totally undermine the statutory scheme. Its effect would be to write out of the Act the 
offense of simple possession, since under such a theory every drug abuser would be liable for 
aiding and abetting the distribution which led to his own possession. 
Id. 
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This type of double-counting works even greater injustice in 
counterfeit currency cases (like Peoni) than in drug cases, because a dollar, 
whether real or counterfeit, is never consumed. Unlike a drug or an apple or 
even an issue of a law review, the dollar exists only to be passed on, again 
and again, as a means of trade. If Peoni were accomplice to every passing of 
his counterfeit bills, his crimes might never end. And under the 
government’s theory he would have been, for remember that § 2 also makes 
illegal acts done through another, regardless of that other person’s mental 
state. Thus even when the bills reach innocent customers, Peoni would have 
committed the crime of circulating bills again each time they change hands, 
for he facilitated each (unknowing) passing by placing the counterfeit bills 
into commerce. 
Judge Hand could have solved the double-counting problem by 
holding that if the transaction itself is the crime (e.g., prostitution or 
narcotics distribution), as opposed to a transaction in furtherance of some 
other crime (e.g., the sale of burglary tools or a murder for hire), then the 
deal itself does not constitute aiding and abetting. A buyer and seller would 
never be accomplices to one another based solely on the purchase or sale. 
That standard would have ended accomplice liability at the deal itself, not 
only for Peoni but for drug dealers, prostitutes, and illegal gamblers as well. 
Those who facilitate such deals would answer as accomplices, but only for 
that deal, and only as an accomplice to one party to the transaction, never to 
both.  
That is the rule in conspiracy.90 If two people, one a buyer and the 
other a seller, agree to a sale of cocaine, they have surely entered an 
agreement to commit a crime. But this agreement is not an agreement for 
purposes of conspiracy; absent some other agreement, such as a joint effort 
at distribution, agreeing to the sale itself is not enough.91 This neat legal 
fiction that the parties to a sale of cocaine do not have an “agreement” for 
the sale of cocaine neatly constrains the punishments attendant to criminal 
conspiracies to truly joint enterprises. Had Judge Hand invented the same 
rule for accomplices as the courts would later craft for conspirators, the 
court would have reached the same result in Peoni without the residue that 
forces courts to sort “knowledge” from “desire.” That subtle distinction—
 
90 “When the sale of some commodity, such as illegal drugs, is the substantive crime, the 
sale agreement itself cannot be the conspiracy, for it has no separate criminal object.” United 
States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also United States v. 
Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 208 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 829–830 
(11th Cir. 1999). 
91 See Lechuga, 994 F.2d at 349. 
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which exonerated Peoni even as it condemns others—has spawned a 
surprisingly resilient problem for jurists ever since. 
For the Peoni analysis is not as clear-cut as it might sound. For 
example, in 2002, Baruch Weiss, then an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the 
Southern District of New York, published a detailed analysis of differing 
interpretations of Peoni among federal appellate courts.92 Weiss described 
the “six different approaches to the question of an aider and abettor’s 
mental state,” ranging from “purposeful intent” to “knowledge is sufficient 
whenever coupled with a substantial act.”93 But these inconsistencies were 
not part of a traditional circuit split; decisions within the same circuits 
contradicted one another. Weiss particularly criticized the Second and 
Seventh Circuits for conflicting stances on the standard, fluctuating from 
case to case between requiring specific intent—i.e., purposeful desire to 
assist the crime—and requiring only assistance with knowledge of the 
criminal acts.94 Knowledge had been sufficient before Peoni, and some 
courts still relied on that earlier analysis.95 Weiss ultimately advocated for a 
“derivative approach,” tying the mental state for an accomplice to that of 
the principal.96 
But Weiss’s analysis is too absolute, as is any approach “that requires 
too much conceptual formulism or notions of constructive intent.”97 Note 
that Peoni is loaded with the hedging words of a circumstances-based 
standard—“in some sort associate himself,” and “an implication of 
purposive attitude.” This ambiguity allows courts to blur the lines between 
knowing assistance and purposeful intent. 
This blurring of the purpose and knowing-assistance standards was on 
full display in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rosemond. In 
reaffirming Peoni, the Court also approvingly noted that it had “found 
[Peoni’s] intent requirement satisfied when a person actively participates in 
a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the 
charged offense.”98 As Justice Alito explained in dissent, however, “[t]here 
is some tension” in the cases about purpose versus knowing assistance as 
 
92 Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344–45 (2002). 
93 Id. at 1373–76.  
94 Id. at 1397–1407. 
95 Id. at 1401–07 (discussing and quoting United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th 
Cir. 1985), modified, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
96 Id. at 1486–88. 
97 This is how professor Robert Weisberg describes attempts to define “intent as opposed 
to mere knowledge.” Weisberg, supra note 75, at 245. 
98 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248–49 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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the mens rea for aiding and abetting, yet the majority “refers 
interchangeably to both of these tests and thus leaves our case law in the 
same, somewhat conflicted state that previously existed.”99 Appellate courts 
also have not described the standard for aiding and abetting with rigorous 
consistency, instead portraying aiding and abetting as covering a spectrum 
of activity, with a bystander’s knowledge falling outside the scope of 
liability for most crimes, and liability escalating from there up to conclusive 
proof of a shared purpose.100 
Perhaps the trickiest mental state between these two extremes is that of 
“knowing assistance.” This is the mental state of which technology 
providers are often accused—i.e., that they knew their users were criminals 
and profited anyways.101 Justice Alito wrote in Rosemond that, in his view, 
“the difference between acting purposefully (when that concept is properly 
understood) and acting knowingly is slight.”102 Because the difference is 
slight, and the concept of acting “purposefully” is so rarely properly 
understood, perhaps particularly by engineers and programmers (or even 
prosecutors), the law risks ensnaring technology providers. Thus, 
uncovering how courts treat the knowing assister is core to this Article. 
Justice Alito was right, however, to note that the Court has done little 
to pin down the mental-state requirement for knowing assisters. Even 
Weiss, in his effort to create distinct categories for accomplice mental 
states, conceded that “the Supreme Court, at one time or another, has 
adopted the purposeful intent approach, the knowledge approach, and the 
derivative approach, and never really discarded any of them.”103 For 
example, in adopting Peoni in Nye & Nissen, the Court also cited United 
States v. Dotterweich,104 which arguably takes a different approach. In 
Dotterweich, the Court upheld the conviction of the president of a company 
caught shipping misbranded drugs—a strict-liability crime—even without 
evidence that he knew about the shipments.105 Weiss argues that 
Dotterweich embraces the derivative approach, applying strict liability to 
 
99 Id. at 1253 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
100 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2011). Some of this lack of clarity in the judicial analysis of aiding and abetting may reflect, 
as William Stuntz argues, that modern American criminal law focuses more on procedural 
protections for defendants than substantive limits on criminal law. Id. at 196. 
101 See infra Part IV for examples. 
102 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1253.  
103 Weiss, supra note 92, at 1468. 
104 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
105 Id. at 278, 284–85.  
2015] TECHNOLOGY AND THE GUILTY MIND 119 
 
the accomplice.106 In the same breath, however, the Court confirmed the 
malleability of accomplice liability, warning in the end that it “would be 
mischievous futility” to attempt to create “a formula embracing the variety 
of conduct whereby persons may responsibly contribute in furthering a 
transaction forbidden by an Act of Congress.”107 
Further, although courts have generally accepted Peoni’s standard as 
governing after the Court adopted it in Nye & Nissen, the Court has not 
rejected earlier cases suggesting that knowledge of criminal purpose is 
enough in some cases.108 One of those earlier cases, Bozza v. United States 
from 1947, is even cited approvingly by the majority in Rosemond.109 
Before Bozza, the Court issued seemingly diametrically opposite 
decisions in the early 1940s that address when providers of goods or 
services may share the users’ guilty mind. Although these cases address 
conspiracy, they have implications for the law of aiding and abetting as 
well. First, in United States v. Falcone, the Court rejected conspiracy 
charges against sellers of sugar, yeast, and cans who knew the products 
would be used in the production of illegal moonshine.110 Three years later, 
in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, the Court swung the other way, 
upholding the conviction of a drug wholesaler for conspiracy to violate drug 
laws.111 A leading state decision on aiding and abetting would later usefully 
summarize the distinction between these cases—and their takeaway point 
for purposes of aiders and abettors—as “that distributors of such dangerous 
products as drugs are required to exercise greater discrimination in the 
 
106 Weiss, supra note 92, at 1468. 
107 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285. 
108 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249 (2014) (citing Bozza v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165 (1947)); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797–98 
(7th Cir. 1985), modified, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985). The Court noted in Fountain: 
Under the older cases, illustrated by Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 636–37 (4th Cir. 
1940), and Bacon v. United States, 127 F.2d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 1942), it was enough that the 
aider and abettor knew the principal’s purpose. Although this is still the test in some states, after 
the Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), adopted Judge 
Learned Hand’s test—that the aider and abettor “in some sort associate himself with the venture, 
that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to 
make it succeed”—it came to be generally accepted that the aider and abettor must share the 
principal’s purpose in order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aider and abettor 
statute. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
109 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249.  
110 United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 208 n.1, 210–11 (1940). 
111 Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714–15 (1943). 
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conduct of their business than are distributors of innocuous substances like 
sugar and yeast.”112 
Then in Bozza, the Court applied this same type of approach to aiding 
and abetting.113 The decision upheld a man’s conviction for aiding and 
abetting the operation of a secret distillery with intent to defraud the 
government of alcohol taxes.114 The dissent insisted that the conviction 
could not be sustained absent evidence that the defendant somehow 
furthered or promoted the tax fraud specifically.115 But the majority 
reasoned that the jury could properly find Bozza guilty by concluding “that 
a person who actively helps to operate a secret distillery knows that he is 
helping to violate Government revenue laws.”116 Indeed, the Court added, 
evading taxes “is a well known object of an illicit distillery. Doubtless few 
who ever worked in such a place, or even heard about one, would fail to 
understand the cry: ‘The Revenuers are coming!’”117 As discussed later, 
Bozza proves especially useful in discussing the potential liability of 
technology service providers.118 
B. MODERN EXAMPLES OF AIDING AND ABETTING 
Like the decisions already discussed, modern aiding-and-abetting 
analysis is flexible and circumstance-specific. Because of this, the best way 
to further tease out common threads is to examine examples and 
hypotheticals. 
A good starting point is a favorite hypothetical of Judge Richard 
Posner,119 derived from a real case in California,120 illustrating why 
 
112 People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
113 Bozza, 330 U.S. at 164–65. 
114 Id. at 164–65. 
115 Id. at 167–68 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 165. 
117 Id. 
118 There are circuit court decisions in the same vein as Bozza. See Bacon v. United 
States, 127 F.2d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 1942); Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 636–37 
(4th Cir. 1940). 
119 Judge Posner has used this analogy (using either a dress or an address book) in at 
least four criminal cases. See United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2008) (drug 
crime); United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 534 
(1993) (drug crime); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(illegal gambling); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985), modified, 
777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985) (murder). He also has used it in regard to copyright law. See In 
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).  
120 See People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). In Lauria, the 
court refused to allow the conviction of a man who provided telephone answering services to 
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knowledge alone is typically not enough to warrant punishment as an aider 
and abettor: 
Suppose you own and operate a store that sells women’s clothing. Every 
month the same young woman buys a red dress from your store. You happen 
to know that she’s a prostitute and wears the dress to signal her occupation to 
prospective customers. By selling her the dress at your normal price you 
assist her illegal activity, and probably you want the activity to succeed since 
if it fails she’ll stop buying the dress and your income will be less. But you 
are not an aider and abettor of prostitution because if you refused to sell to 
her she would buy her red dress from another clothing store, one whose 
proprietor and staff didn’t know her profession. So you’re not really helping 
her or promoting prostitution, as you would be if you recommended 
customers to her in exchange for a commission.121 
So too, Judge Posner reasoned, the typical buyer of cocaine does not 
join the sellers’ conspiracy because the sellers could no doubt find other 
willing buyers.122 
Other decisions clarify, however, that even after Nye & Nissen, 
knowledge plus some act of support can lead to liability as an aider and 
abettor. Contrast the red-dress hypo with the conviction of inmate Randy 
Gometz.123 Another prisoner, Thomas Silverstein, twice convicted of killing 
other inmates, stopped next to Gometz’s cell.124 Gometz quickly pulled up 
his shirt to reveal a shank in his waistband, and Silverstein reached into 
Gometz’s cell, grabbed the shank, and stabbed an escorting guard twenty-
nine times.125 Gometz was convicted of aiding and abetting the murder but 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him on appeal.126 
Judge Posner, again writing for the court, noted that there remained some 
“support for relaxing the [purposeful-intent] requirement when the crime is 
particularly grave.”127 Thus, he continued, the jury properly convicted 
Gometz based on evidence that he “knew that Silverstein, given his history 
of prison murders, could have only one motive in drawing the shank and 
 
a group of prostitutes. Id. at 630. The court concluded that “although proof of Lauria’s 
knowledge of the criminal activities of his patrons was sufficient to charge him with that 
fact, there was insufficient evidence that he intended to further their criminal activities, and 
hence insufficient proof of his participation in a criminal conspiracy with his codefendants to 
further prostitution.” Id. at 635. 
121 Colon, 549 F.3d at 571 (internal citations omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 The facts of this example come from United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 793. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 798. 
127 Id. 
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that was to make a deadly assault.”128 Gometz, in this sense, calls to mind 
Bozza, whom the Supreme Court declared to be an accomplice to tax fraud 
because dodging taxes was the clear purpose of running a secret 
distillery.129 The decision also reaffirms the idea that “distributors of such 
dangerous products,”130 whether drugs or shanks, must use greater care than 
distributors of yeast or dresses. 
To further see how this tension between knowledge and purpose plays 
out in a specific context, it is useful to look at cases involving people 
assisting drug dealers because—courtesy of the war on drugs—they serve 
as a microcosm of the law of aiding and abetting. The easiest case is when 
an assister admits acting with intent to help the venture to distribute 
drugs.131 A harder question arises when the evidence shows mere 
knowledge, but intent remains ambiguous—a guilty finding requires more 
than mere knowledge of intended drug dealing.132 On one hand, the act of 
simply being a passenger in the car driven to a drug deal, even with full 
knowledge of the destination, is not enough to support a guilty finding for 
aiding and abetting.133 On the other hand, the accused’s conduct in aid of 
the illicit enterprise need not be overwhelming; it is enough that a person 
knowingly drove a drug dealer to a pick-up location.134 The difference 
between passenger and driver is superficially one of actus reus (i.e., being a 
passenger is passive while driving is active) and not of mens rea. But that 
 
128 Id. at 799. 
129 Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165 (1947). 
130 People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).  
131 See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
conviction of driver when there was evidence he admitted that the purpose of the trip was to 
purchase drugs and that he took a vacation with a dealer in order for the dealer to “set him up 
dealing illegal drugs”). 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 869 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
133 Compare United States v. Diaz-Boyzo, 432 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Diaz-
Boyzo's presence in Eustolio Villa-Gamino's truck, where Eustolio Villa-Gamino had drugs 
hidden in a beer box inside a white bag, is insufficient by itself to support his conviction.”); 
United States v. Pena, 983 F.2d 71, 73 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Guilt by association with the driver 
of the car, the act of being a passenger in the car, is insufficient.”); United States v. Sanchez-
Mata, 925 F. 2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Sanchez-Mata’s presence as a passenger in the 
car cannot support an aiding and abetting theory.”), with United States v. Santana, 524 F.3d 
851, 855 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficient evidence of aiding and abetting drug dealing 
when passenger knew the illegal purpose of the trip, was paid and had been paid for similar 
trip before, lied to officers, and had drugs on his person); Diaz-Boyzo, 432 F.3d at 1270 
(finding sufficient evidence when passenger participated in multiple trips with drug dealer, 
may have observed drug delivery, and kept loaded gun in his lap during the delivery).  
134 See, e.g., Heras, 609 F.3d at 107. 
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distinction would not explain why being a passenger in a car—with the 
intent to make the trip seem like a family vacation rather than a drug 
smuggling expedition—would be aiding and abetting despite involving the 
same conduct of “being a passenger in the car” that courts have found 
insufficient in other contexts.135 Nor does it address why simply sitting at 
home can be aiding and abetting if the accused lived in a safe house in order 
to make the house appear occupied.136 The distinction is what a reasonable 
jury infers from the act about the accused’s desires, and the more passive 
the action, the less likely an inference of guilt. 
It is no defense, however, that the assistance was not essential to the 
crime. Courts regularly uphold the conviction of middlemen who assisted 
only with the financial end of a drug deal, even though the exchange of cash 
is not an element of a drug offense.137 
The Court’s recent decision in Rosemond arises from a similar context. 
Rosemond traveled with two compatriots to a local park to conduct a drug 
deal.138 When the deal went south, one of the three fired a handgun.139 The 
government charged Rosemond in the alternative with (1) use of a firearm 
during a drug crime and (2) aiding and abetting that offense.140 The jury 
convicted Rosemond of the firearm offense but did not indicate whether it 
 
135 See United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2012). In Figueroa, the 
court reasoned:  
Figueroa paid for Cruz and his family to fly from Chicago to Texas, and doubtless the purpose of 
having Cruz drive with his family rather than alone was, by making his trip seem innocent, to 
reduce the likelihood of his being apprehended en route. The family members thus were 
outsiders involved in the drug enterprise. 
Id.; see also WE’RE THE MILLERS (Warner Bros. 2013) (depicting a pot smuggler who 
recruits a fake “family” to travel with him in an effort to deflect suspicion while crossing the 
border).  
136 See United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The 
government claims that her role may have been to live at the house, give it a lived-in 
appearance, and guard the cocaine. Such a role, if established by probative evidence, would 
permit a conviction for possession as an aider and abetter.”), overruled by United States v. 
Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 124 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]hough one 
need not covet cash to be guilty of a § 841(a)(1) distribution, one may certainly aid and abet 
such a distribution—‘associate [oneself] with the venture . . . [so] that [one] seek[s] by 
[one’s] action to make it succeed’—by facilitating the financial climax of the deal.”) 
(alterations in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 
336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)); United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(“Raper’s acts, in apparently arranging the sale, receiving the money, and counselling Childs 
satisfied all the requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) for conviction as an aider or abettor.”). 
138 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014). 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
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found that he used the gun himself or had merely aided and abetted in its 
use.141 The Court ultimately reversed Rosemond’s conviction because the 
trial court had used a jury instruction that did not require him to have had 
prior knowledge that one of his compatriots brought a gun.142 In doing so, 
the Court also settled a circuit split about whether someone can be guilty of 
aiding and abetting a crime based on aiding just one part of the crime and 
not every element.143 For the Court, it was enough that Rosemond aided the 
drug dealing, for which the gun became a part (as long as he had knowledge 
of the gun’s existence). 
Interestingly, in two footnotes, the Court made a point to state that it 
was not taking a position on two important lingering issues about aiding 
and abetting law.144 First, the Court noted that “[s]ome authorities suggest 
an exception to the general rule when another crime is the ‘natural and 
probable consequence’ of the crime the defendant intended to abet.”145 
Second, and more important for the issue at hand, the Court stated that it 
was not dealing “with defendants who incidentally facilitate a criminal 
venture rather than actively participate in it,” as with “the owner of a gun 
store who sells a firearm to a criminal, knowing but not caring how the gun 
will be used.”146 The Court’s silence on this point leaves open the question 
of the liability of technologists who provide knowing assistance to criminal 
users. 
C. WHEN IS KNOWING ASSISTANCE ENOUGH? 
This discussion illustrates that courts, including the Supreme Court, 
have not spoken uniformly about the standard for determining the guilt of 
the knowing assister, the category most likely to ensnare technology 
providers. At first glance, this lack of uniformity could cause one to lament, 
as does William LaFave in his leading criminal law treatise, that the cases 
“are generally in a state of confusion.”147 On closer look, though, a through-
line emerges among the differing standards: a “substantial unoffending 
uses” test. Before examining this test, however, consider three other 
proposals to harmonize the case law on aiding and abetting. 
 
141 Id. at 1244. 
142 Id. at 1251–52. 
143 Id. at 1246–48. 
144 Id. at 1248 n.7, 1249 n.8. Somewhat mysteriously, Justice Scalia joined the majority’s 
opinions except for those two footnotes. Id. at 1242. 
145 Id. at 1248 n.7. 
146 Id. at 1249 n.8. 
147 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 13.2(e). 
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First, consider the approach Judge Posner suggested with Gometz’s 
shank, that knowledge is enough for major crimes. This approach reconciles 
some of the cases, LaFave observes, as the seriousness distinction explains 
why courts would impose liability “for knowing aid to a group planning the 
overthrow of the government or to one planning to burglarize a bank, but 
not for knowing aid to such crimes as gambling, prostitution, and unlawful 
sale of liquor.”148 Moreover, this distinction may be justified on policy 
grounds: it burdens merchants with the obligation of policing their 
customers only for the most serious crimes.149 But it is hard to see this 
approach gaining real traction in today’s courts, as judges are often loath to 
openly make policy decisions, such as the varying severity of different 
crimes.150 
A second approach is to put a gloss of substantial facilitation on § 2. 
The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code originally recommended this 
approach, reasoning that it would protect vendors of readily available goods 
and peripheral bit players who may have acted with willful blindness.151 But 
the American Law Institute rejected the draftsmen’s suggestion in favor of 
the Peoni party line (the Code currently requires accomplices to share “the 
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense”).152 
LaFave suggests that the test was rejected because of “vagueness,”153 but 
 
148 Id. § 13.2(d) (internal citations omitted). 
149 See id.; cf. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1992). In 
Blankenship, the court stated: 
Because a lessor almost inevitably knows his tenant’s business, the imposition of a criminal 
penalty is likely to deter but not to raise the costs of legitimate transactions. A bookie needs a 
wire room; if the law deters landlords from providing space for these operations, it will 
substantially cut down on crime. 
Id. 
150 For example, recall John Roberts comparing judges to umpires: “Umpires don’t make 
the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.” Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.); 
see also United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 463 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“A few judges may think that Congress is 
omnicompetent; more pretend to think that—what they really think being that literal 
interpretation of statutes is necessary to save the nation from judicial tyranny.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
151 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 13.2(d) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, cmt. at 318 
n.58 (1985)). Note that the less-serious crimes in this example are also all transactional 
crimes, suggesting that the Peoni rule should really be an exception for transactional crimes 
alone. 
152 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a). 
153 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 13.2(d). 
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there is a better reason to discard it. The test focuses on the degree that the 
accomplice’s act furthered the criminal enterprise, even though the 
helpfulness of a certain act may only truly be known by the principal 
offender, and thus the approach risks punishing people for acts far beyond 
any they could have anticipated.154 In any event, it does not appear to 
accurately reflect varying decisions of federal appellate courts. 
A third approach, perhaps the most popular among scholars, is 
“reconceiving accessorial liability as a species of recklessness.”155 For 
example, Larry Alexander argues “purpose and knowledge can be reduced 
to recklessness because, like recklessness, they exhibit the basic moral vice 
of insufficient concern for the interests of others.”156 Taking a similar 
approach, Daniel Yeager has argued that accomplice liability should turn on 
the extent the accused engaged in “excessive risk-taking.”157 Yet although 
the concepts of recklessness and risk-taking may be helpful in 
understanding why society would punish knowing assisters,158 it is unlikely 
that federal courts will eschew the hoary requirements of knowledge and 
purpose anytime soon. 
This Article posits a fourth approach, one examining the “substantial 
unoffending uses” of an accused’s contributions, to describe what federal 
courts generally do when faced with knowing assistance. This approach 
differs from the “substantial facilitation” inquiry, because rather than 
focusing on the degree the accused’s assistance helped the offender, it 
focuses on the degree that the assistance was susceptible to substantial 
unoffending uses (like the red dress) versus well-known criminal uses (like 
Bozza’s still or Gometz’s shank). The test finds its best use in regard to 
knowing and neutral defendants—when there is evidence the accused knew 
someone was a criminal but no evidence of a desire either to aid or to 
hinder them in their criminal acts. This approach also addresses the problem 
 
154 For a similar argument, see Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical 
Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 
91, 121–23 (1985), which criticizes the “substantial participation test” for leading to 
“morally inappropriate conclusions” by punishing people not “for their personal connection 
with the punishable harm, but for their decision to join the criminal enterprise.” 
155 Weisberg, supra note 75, at 248 (emphasis in original). Professor Weisberg concludes 
that this approach “is a remarkable common denominator to [recent] scholarly efforts 
however much they otherwise differ.” Id. at 247. 
156 Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal 
Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 931 (2000). 
157 Daniel B. Yeager, Dangerous Games and the Criminal Law, 16 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 
3, 4, 10 (1997). 
158 See Weisberg, supra note 75, at 247–61 (examining the usefulness of the recklessness 
standard). 
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of “willful blindness” by examining whether the assistance at issue 
bespeaks principally one true purpose to the outside observer (or, one could 
say, the reasonable person), rather than the accused’s subjective mindset.159 
D. FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE “SUBSTANTIAL 
UNOFFENDING USES” ANALYSIS 
To clarify the “substantial unoffending uses” approach, allow one 
more hypothetical enlisting prolific bank robber John Dillinger. Dillinger 
stops at a convenience store across the street from the local bank and asks to 
buy gloves. If the clerk recognizes Dillinger from a wanted poster and, not 
caring who he is, sells him gloves, the clerk is not a criminal: the gloves, 
like the red dress, have substantial unoffending uses. Now suppose 
Dillinger asks for bullets. If the clerk does not recognize him and obliges, 
there is no crime: no law bans bullets, and no nominally legal act is 
chargeable as aiding and abetting if the accused had no knowledge they 
were aiding a criminal. But if the clerk sells the bullets—knowing that in 
Dillinger’s hands they are, like Bozza’s still, employable for chiefly one 
obvious, criminal purpose—then the clerk may be found guilty of aiding 
and abetting bank robbery, even if he swears that he did not share 
Dillinger’s reprobate purpose. Finally, if Dillinger empties the gunpowder 
from the bullets and uses his gun’s flintlock mechanism to burn down the 
bank,160 the clerk is not punishable for arson; starting fires is not a well-
known use for a bullet. 
But just as a firearm is not a cigarette lighter,161 a prison shank (also 
called a shiv) is not a bookmark. When, as in Fountain, a defendant equips 
a murderer with a shiv, the prosecution will have no trouble proving a 
desire to aid murder because a prison shiv has no unoffending uses. A 
prisoner’s mere possession of such a weapon violates prison rules, and the 
crude stabbing implement admits but one, homicidal, use.162 
 
159 For a useful discussion of how courts and academics have responded to the problem 
of “willful blindness” in regard to accomplice liability, see id. at 255–61. 
160 For an animated image of a flintlock mechanism generating sparks, see Flintlock 
Mechanism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flintlock_mechanism (last visited Sept. 
22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZE5B-WLVV. 
161 A pistol may, however, be repurposed to such an end. See United States v. Dotson, 
712 F.3d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 238 (2013) (mem.).  
162 Gometz argued that Fountain might have wanted the shank “for purposes of 
intimidation, escape, or self-defense.” United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 
1985), modified on reh’g, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985). All of these uses were also illegal, 
however, and it would be a stretch (though not an impossible one) even under the earlier 
bank robber hypothetical to argue for exoneration because you believed you were abetting a 
different crime by the same principal, even if it were a less-serious one. In any event, the 
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This idea is further underscored by tweaking the oft-cited hypothetical 
about a shopkeeper serving women of the night.163 Consider that, instead of 
prostitution, the shopkeeper stands accused of abetting a murder, the same 
crime as in Fountain, by selling a dress. One night, the woman asks for a 
dress to wear while murdering her pimp. She wants a red dress because that 
will signal to the pimp that she is conducting business as usual and will 
permit her to get the drop on him. If the shopkeeper sells her the dress, 
charging his regular price and refraining from comment on her plan, he 
neither aids nor abets murder, and to hold otherwise would be to require 
anyone with knowledge of an impending murder to take action to stop it. 
The law cannot so deputize the whole world. The shopkeeper might have a 
moral obligation to dissuade the woman, but not a legal one. 
The distinction lies in the type of aid provided and the uses to which it 
may be put. Even with perfect knowledge of the woman’s scheme, by 
selling a dress the shopkeeper has not materially aided a murder. The dress 
has not only substantial unoffending uses, it has exclusively unoffending 
uses. Its substantive purpose is to clad the wearer’s nakedness, not to kill. 
Our murderess does not need a particular red dress, one that only the 
shopkeeper possesses; any red dress will do, and in a pinch, the dress might 
be ochre or rust. Murder does not depend on what dress the killer wears.164 
No reasonable jury could convict a shopkeeper for providing a dress 
because even when the purchaser vows to commit murder whilst wearing it, 
the dress possesses substantial unoffending uses. 
Several courts have observed that the sale of gasoline to someone who 
knew it would be used to make Molotov cocktails “for terroristic use” 
would be aiding and abetting.165 But the sale of gasoline to the same 
customer, with the same avowed terroristic intentions, knowing that this 
 
circumstances in Fountain made the other suggested purposes of the shiv sufficiently 
unlikely for a reasonable jury to convict. Id. 
163 See United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 
887 (7th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 506 U.S. 534 (1993); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 
1227 (7th Cir. 1990); Fountain, 768 F.2d at 798. 
164 A point memorably made by Marisa Tomei in her Oscar-winning role as Mona Lisa 
Vito. In response to a question from her fiancé (portrayed by Joe Pesci) about what pants to 
wear for deer hunting, she responds: “Imagine you’re a deer . . . . Bam! A [expletive] bullet 
rips off part of your head! Your brains are laying on the ground in little bloody pieces. Now I 
ask you: Would you give a [expletive] what kind of pants the son of a [expletive] who shot 
you was wearing?” See MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992). Contra KISS, DRESSED 
TO KILL (Casablanca 1975).  
165 E.g., Fountain, 768 F.2d at 798; People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1967). 
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fuel will go only to fill the gas tank of his truck would not be aiding and 
abetting.166 Judge Posner has suggested that the distinction here is 
“essential” versus “trivial” aid.167 But a better way to understand the same 
distinction is as one between offending and unoffending uses for the 
accused’s goods or services. A waitress serving the fugitive Dr. Richard 
Kimble168 in a restaurant would be found not guilty of aiding a fugitive (in 
the unlikely event she were even charged), whereas a waitress sneaking 
food out the back to Dr. Richard Kimble as he hides in the bushes would be 
charged and likely convicted. The acts in one sense are the same—
providing food that helps keep a known fugitive alive. But they suggest 
different desires on the part of the waitress, with the first suggesting a 
desire to serve food to customers (a substantial unoffending use for any 
restaurant), and the second evidencing a desire, more than willful blindness, 
to aid a fugitive. 
As will be discussed later, this comparison is particularly useful for 
crimes involving potentially “dual use” technology. Consider the case of 
Alfred Anaya, a savant at creating secret compartments for cars, who was 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, even though he never 
expressly agreed to assist with his clientele’s illegal endeavors.169 If instead 
of a car, Anaya had installed a hidden holster in a red dress to conceal our 
murderess’s weapon of choice, the addition of a secret pocket would make 
the use of the dress material to the plan. Although such a secret may have 
unoffending uses, whether in a dress or a car, once the compartment’s 
content is known to be illicit, it has but one use. When technologists know 
that their work is put to but one, illicit use—the government, for example, 
presented evidence that Anaya was told to make his compartments fit a kilo 
of cocaine—their provision of that work may fairly infer a desire that it be 
put to that use.170 
 
166 It might transform the use if the gas station were particularly remote, such that 
refusing to sell the gas might actually frustrate the terrorist’s travel plans. Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 
887 (inference of desire to abet may be inferred from “essential assistance,” but not “trivial” 
assistance); Giovannetti, 919 F.2d at 1227 (selling an address book is insufficient evidence 
of desire to abet prostitution because principal, “at an infinitesimal cost in added 
inconvenience, would simply shop for address books among stationers who did not know her 
trade”). 
167 See cases cited supra note 166. 
168 Doctor Kimble is the titular fugitive in The Fugitive movie and television series. 
See THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993); The Fugitive (ABC television series Sept. 17, 1963 
to Aug. 29, 1967).  
169 See Koerner, supra note 5. 
170 Cf. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 797–98. 
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E. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
One final point must be mentioned before addressing the culpability of 
today’s technologists. The foregoing discussion establishes that the standard 
for mental culpability in aiding and abetting remains uncertain, not only 
between circuits but within circuits, and part of this uncertainty can be 
resolved by applying this Article’s proposed “substantial unoffending uses” 
analysis. But not all of it. What remains of the seeming contradiction in 
these appellate decisions might be explained by understanding the nature of 
the appellate review. 
In the appellate cases discussed in this Part, the appellants’ challenges 
to their convictions for aiding and abetting were not facial challenges to the 
statute, nor were they challenges claiming that the indictment failed to 
allege a crime. They challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction.171 
In fact, appellants in particular challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence of their intent. In a direct federal appeal, defendants rarely 
challenge as insufficient proof of their actions for two reasons. First, the 
nature of federal jurisdiction is that it is largely discretionary, and federal 
prosecutions thus follow extensive investigations and mountains of 
evidence of the defendant’s conduct. Wiretaps, surveillance videos, 
confidential informants, and cooperating witnesses often leave little room 
for all but metaphysical doubt about a defendant’s conduct. Second, 
because aiding and abetting deals almost exclusively with acts that, taken 
alone, are legal or even laudable, such as giving a ride to a friend or setting 
a broken leg, the defendant may have no reason to dispute his actions, only 
his motives for them. 
The problem with appellate rulings about intent is that, because of the 
standard of review, they do a poor job of clarifying whether any particular 
piece of evidence is conclusive proof of a guilty mind. Appellate review of 
the sufficiency of the evidence of a jury verdict is one of extreme deference, 
and permits reversal only when no reasonable jury could convict.172 The 
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
drawing all inferences in its favor.173 So when an appellate court upholds a 
 
171 See, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 162 (1947); Fountain, 768 F.2d at 
794. 
172 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (emphasis omitted)). 
173 Id. 
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conviction for aiding and abetting, that does not mean that the evidence is 
per se proof of the crime alleged, only that a jury might convict based on 
that evidence.174 This deference to the jury and to the trial judge, who heard 
and saw the witnesses and thus could best gauge their credibility, requires 
that appellate courts uphold convictions for aiding and abetting based upon 
a wide range of evidence of the defendant’s desires. The jury need only 
have sufficient proof to draw an inference of desire to aid a crime, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. That standard will always 
allow some ambiguity in the application of aiding and abetting analysis. 
IV. THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY PROVIDERS 
The United States must figure out how to harness the important 
creative force at the heart of the hacker ethic while still deterring destructive 
criminal wrongdoers. Although this balance must be struck with the help of 
technologists, the business community, and legislatures, it is often courts, 
for better or for worse, which are left to decide how society will treat 
technologists whose creations lead to widespread criminal activity. The 
second half of this Article seeks to clarify the application of aiding and 
abetting to Internet crime by providing examples of how criminal 
proceedings may play out against dual-use technologies.175 
There are many potential examples, but this Part will address three 
broad, overlapping categories of technologies with criminal uses. First, 
there is technology that, although technically capable of innocent uses, was 
clearly designed for use in crime, as exemplified by spam software. Second 
is technology where the intended purpose is not clear; it may well have 
been designed for legitimate use but is being used rampantly for illegal 
activity. The example here is file-sharing services: cyberlockers, 
bookmarking sites, linking sites, and the like. Finally, there are technologies 
designed for good—like anonymity software and tools for testing security 
flaws—that by their very nature are susceptible to criminal misuse. 
 
174 Id. 
175 Although vagueness in criminal law may at times be a virtue, there is a countervailing 
interest in clarity from the technology industry. See Paul Szynol, Fuzzy Boundaries: The 
Potential Impact of Vague Secondary Liability Doctrines on Technology Innovation, in THE 
NEXT DIGITAL DECADE, supra note 33, at 393, 395 (“Without clear guidance from the legal 
system, tech companies are forced to engage in a ‘fingers crossed’ product design 
process . . . . Such risk can dissuade even the most resolute investors from marketing their 
invention—and it can literally bankrupt the braver among them.”).  
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A. TECHNOLOGY DESIGNED FOR ILLEGAL USE: SPAM 
EMAIL MARKETING SOFTWARE 
In the early 2000s, Alan Ralsky and his son-in-law, Scott Bradley, 
made millions of dollars through their Internet business in the suburbs of 
Detroit, Michigan.176 The problem was that their business relied on 
artificially inflating the price of thinly traded stock by sending unsolicited 
bulk emails, a.k.a. spam, misleadingly promoting the stock—a standard 
“pump and dump” scheme.177 This behavior is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1037, part of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography 
And Marketing Act of 2003 (the CAN-SPAM Act). Spam remains 
enticingly lucrative: in 2011, researchers hijacked a spam botnet—a 
network of computers infected with software surreptitiously allowing 
outside control—and concluded that the spammer in control could make 
about $7,000 per day.178 
But what distinguishes the Ralsky case from other large-scale spam 
takedowns179 is the wide net cast by the prosecution. After indicting Ralsky, 
Bradley, and nine other coconspirators, federal prosecutors expanded the 
case to include David Patton, a software programmer who sold the email 
marketing tools Ralsky used.180 Patton was charged with aiding and abetting 
Ralsky’s spam operation.181 Facing jail time, Patton pleaded guilty, 
 
176 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Detroit Spammer and Three Co-Conspirators 
Sentenced for Multi-Million Dollar E-mail Stock Fraud Scheme (Nov. 23, 2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1275.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/6HMY-SXTU.  
177 Nate Anderson, “Godfather of Spam” Goes to Prison for Four Years, ARS TECHNICA, 
(Nov. 24, 2009, 11:40 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/11/godfather-of-spam-
goes-to-prison-for-four-years/, archived at http://perma.cc/BFK-2GTK.  
178 Julie Rehmeyer, Equation: How Much Money Do Spammers Rake In?, WIRED (Feb. 
28, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/02/st_equation_spamprofits/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GR3L-WNXE. A 2010 survey also found that 43% of all email 
users in North America and Western Europe having opened or accessed spam emails, with 
11% having clicked on links contained in email that they suspected to be spam. IPSOS PUB. 
AFFAIRS, KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2010 MAAWG EMAIL SECURITY AWARENESS AND USAGE 
SURVEY (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.maawg.org/sites/maawg/files/news/
2010_MAAWG-Consumer_Survey_Key_Findings.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DH53-
LP4Z. 
179 The stories of the federal actions against Oleg Nikolaenko and Sanford “Spamford” 
Wallace are recounted in Chapters 6 and 7 of ANDERSON, supra note 29. 
180 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Software Writer Pleads Guilty to 
Aiding and Abetting Detroit Spam Conspiracy (July 7, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-664.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C3C6-AHKA 
[hereinafter Patton Press Release]. 
181 Id. 
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admitting that he designed his software to enable insertion of false 
information into email headers and the use of “proxy” computers to conceal 
an email’s origin.182 (Both of these activities are specifically prohibited by 
the CAN-SPAM Act.183) He also admitted that he sold his software to 
Ralsky knowing that it would be used to violate the CAN-SPAM Act, and 
that he continued to provide product support with the intent to assist the 
operation’s illegal actions.184 Patton ultimately received a sentence of one 
day in jail for aiding and abetting violations of § 1037.185 
Because Patton’s admissions as a whole provided a factual basis to 
sustain his guilty plea, the court never had an opportunity to comment on 
which of his actions may have alone supported his convictions. The case 
usefully illustrates, however, the potential levels of involvement a software 
developer may have with a criminal organization. Based on the cases 
discussed earlier, it is clear that Patton’s admission to providing the 
software and ongoing support with intent to assist the spam operation made 
him guilty of aiding and abetting. But what remains unclear is whether it 
would have been enough that Patton sold the software knowing that Ralsky 
would use it to violate the law, or that he designed the software for that 
purpose. 
These same questions are at the heart of any prosecution of computer 
programmers employed by criminal enterprises. A good recent example is 
the ongoing prosecution of Jerome O’Hara and George Perez, former 
programmers for infamous Ponzi schemer Bernie Madoff, who were 
indicted in 2010 and went to trial in 2014 for allegedly using their technical 
acumen to hide Madoff’s long-running fraud.186 
The answer to the second question—whether designing programs for 
illegal use is a criminal offense—is the easiest. Designing a tool for use in a 
particular crime and giving it to a known purveyor of that crime would, 
almost certainly, satisfy even the most stringent Peoni adherent. The act of 
design for indictable use implies purposive attitude and a desire to aid the 
crime’s commission, and the provision to the known criminal is an act of 
association with the venture. It was likely similar reasoning that, in March 
2014, led the jury in the case of Madoff’s programmers, who had worked 
 
182 Id. 
183 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
184 Patton Press Release, supra note 180. 
185 United States v. Patton, No. 07-cr-20627-12 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2009) (judgment as 
to David A. Patton). 
186 See Indictment, United States v. O’Hara, No. 10-cr-00228 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010), 
ECF No. 17. 
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for him for more than a decade, to find them guilty of conspiring to commit 
securities fraud.187 
But the first question—whether the knowing sale of software capable 
of both legal and illegal use to a criminal is a criminal offense—is harder. If 
Patton’s software enabled spamming, and he knew Ralsky’s intent, then to 
determine Patton’s guilt, the court must examine the range of the software’s 
use and what Patton knew about Ralsky. If the software was broadly 
capable of legitimate marketing uses, even though Patton somehow knew 
Ralsky to be a spammer, then Patton, like the seller of the red dress, is 
innocent; he should not be expected to police the use of his software. But if 
the software is capable of chiefly one use, and it is spam, Patton is in danger 
of criminal punishment. 
B. TECHNOLOGY OVERRUN WITH ILLEGAL USE: FILE-
SHARING SERVICES 
Thanks to robust efforts by media companies and lawmakers to 
prevent file-sharing,188 many of the legal decisions addressing dual-use 
technology come from the world of copyright. In the early 1990s peer-to-
peer file-sharing flourished, propelled by hacker-led services like Napster, 
and it took more than a decade for media companies to stomp them out 
through civil litigation.189 Throughout this time, appellate courts were 
repeatedly forced to grapple with these services’ common defense: that they 
could not be liable for the infringing acts of their users. The matter 
ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court, which rejected the services’ 
argument in its 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd.190 Contributory, or “secondary,” copyright infringers, the 
Court concluded, are liable, despite their technology’s dual uses, because 
there was evidence their operators intended to “induce” infringement.191 
 
187 See Erik Larson, Madoff Aides Convicted in $17.5 Billion Ponzi Trial After Decades 
Working for Firm, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-03-24/madoff-aides-convicted-in-five-month-fraud-trial.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/JM6J-GAR6.  
188 See Bill D. Herman, A Political History of DRM and Related Copyright Debates, 
1987–2012, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162 (2012) (tracing the history of the strong copyright 
coalition). 
189 See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 2001); see also ANDERSON, 
supra note 29, at 199–202 (documenting the history of this litigation). 
190 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
191 Id. at 913, 932–33, 938–39. 
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Such inducement, the Court observed, was shown by Grokster marketing to 
former Napster users and not creating stronger anti-infringement tools.192 
The parallels between Grokster’s standard of intent to promote 
infringement and the aiding and abetting standard of “purposive attitude” 
are obvious. As Judge Posner puts it, aiding and abetting is “the criminal 
counterpart to contributory infringement.”193 It is unsurprising, then, that 
federal prosecutors recently sought to apply this newly anointed theory of 
secondary infringement in the criminal context through use of § 2.194 
In 2011, the United States prosecuted the operators of NinjaVideo, a 
site collecting links to copyright-infringing files stored on a popular 
cyberlocker named Megaupload.195 After the NinjaVideo prosecution ended 
in a series of plea deals,196 the next step was logical: go after Megaupload, 
then the “13th most frequently visited website on the entire Internet.”197 In 
2012, the company was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia, where it 
rented servers, for aiding and abetting criminal copyright infringement.198 
Although the Megaupload prosecution has stalled because of problems 
extraditing the company’s flamboyant leader from New Zealand,199 the case 
has attracted significant controversy over the scope of aiding and abetting 
copyright infringement.200 Viewed in a certain light, the prosecution is a 
success even without a conviction. As Orin Kerr explains, the government’s 
goal was clearly “to push and prod other companies to take copyright 
 
192 Id. at 938–39. 
193 In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 
F.3d 788, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (analogizing secondary copyright 
liability to driving someone to a crime). 
194 See Martin & Newhall, supra note 7, at 114–15. 
195 Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens Innovation and the 
Rule of Law, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 63–64 (Jerry Brito 
ed., 2012); Rob Fischer, A Ninja in Our Sites, AM. PROSPECT, Jan./Feb. 2012, at 27; David 
Kravets, Megaupload Assisted U.S. Prosecution of Smaller File-Sharing Service, WIRED 
(Nov. 20, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/megaupload-
investigation-roots/, archived at http://perma.cc/5GSM-RA3B. 
196 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Leader of NinjaVideo.net Website Sentenced to 
22 Months in Prison for Criminal Copyright Conspiracy (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/01/20120106ninjavideonr.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DF2F-M65U. 
197 Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-cr-00003 at 2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 
2012), ECF No. 34 [hereinafter Dotcom Indictment]. 
198 Id. at 1, 18–19, 31 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2319; 17 U.S.C. § 506). 
199 The judge presiding over the Megaupload case commented that the service’s 
operators “may never be extradited.” United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-cr-00003, 2012 WL 
4788433, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2012) (order denying motion to dismiss the indictment). 
200 See Martin & Newhall, supra note 7, at 119 n.98. 
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infringement more seriously.”201 To that end, there is evidence that, after 
the government seized Megaupload’s domain names, assets, and data on its 
servers, several smaller file-sharing services voluntarily shut down,202 and 
movie studio revenues increased significantly.203 
But whether the government’s theory holds water—as with any 
question of aiding and abetting—depends on the government’s ability to 
produce evidence of knowledge of and intent to further criminal activity. As 
to Megaupload, James Grimmelmann observes, “If proven at trial, there’s 
easily enough in the indictment to prove criminal copyright infringement 
many times over.”204 Indeed, the government says it has evidence of 
admitted intent, quoting private conversations among Megaupload’s top 
brass in which they discuss helping infringers.205 The government also cites 
the company’s repeated refusal to remove (as required by law) its 
profitable-but-infringing content after receiving notice of infringement.206 If 
the government proves these allegations, it is hard to imagine a court 
deciding that the company’s operators did not participate in infringement as 
something they wished to bring about. 
The tougher question is for the future, when cases are brought against 
less egregious offenders. As Grimmelmann notes, “much of what the 
[Megaupload] indictment details are legitimate business strategies many 
websites use to increase their traffic and revenues: offering premium 
subscriptions, running ads, rewarding active users.”207 If the case never goes 
to trial, questions about which of these strategies are legal will linger. Some 
 
201 Philip S. Corwin, MegaBust’s MegaQuestions Cloud the Net’s Future, CIRCLEID 
(Feb. 13, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/megabusts_megaquestions_cloud_
the_nets_future/, archived at http://perma.cc/8494-HU4T.  
202 See id. Corwin notes: 
In any event, the number of services from which to choose and their functionality appear to be in 
at least temporary decline post-MegaBust. The FileSonic and FileServe services disabled all file-
sharing within days after, and Upload.to cut off all access from U.S. users (notwithstanding the 
domain being hosted on the country code TLD of the Pacific Ocean nation of Tonga). Hong 
Kong-based Filesonic, one of the Internet’s top 10 file-sharing sites, terminated its affiliate 
rewards program. FileJungle and UploadStation disabled all third party downloads, and 
UploadBox and x7.to shut down all operations. 
Id. 
203 See Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact of the 
Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales 24 (Sept 14. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229349, archived at http://
perma.cc/QRF8-C2YN. 
204 Corwin, supra note 201. 
205 See Dotcom Indictment, supra note 197, at 42. 
206 Id. at 10–11. 
207 Corwin, supra note 201. 
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commentators suggest, for instance, that the same approach could be used 
against search engines or video-sharing sites for linking to infringing 
content, or classified-advertisement websites like Backpage or Craigslist 
that have been criticized for facilitating child exploitation.208 These latter 
examples bring us to this Article’s final category of technology, designed 
for legal purposes, but susceptible to illegal use. 
C. TECHNOLOGY SUSCEPTIBLE TO ILLEGAL USE: THE TOR 
PROJECT, SECURITY SOFTWARE 
“Onion routing” is a good example of technology clearly created, in 
the spirit of the hacker ethic, for the betterment of society. In the early 
2000s, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory created software meant to 
protect online anonymity by passing Internet communications through a 
network of computers throughout the world.209 The process works by using 
layers of relay points, each with its own encryption, to conceal the identity 
of the originating computer. A long-running project to distribute free 
versions of this software—now called “Tor,” short for “the onion router”—
is still largely funded by the U.S. government, through contributions from 
entities like the State Department and the National Science Foundation.210 
The project is also supported by foreign governments, not-for-profit 
organizations, and private donors.211 The Tor project has scores of 
legitimate uses—law-enforcement officers might use it to disguise a 
computer’s address during an online sting operation, for instance, or 
persecuted religious groups might rely on it to bypass censorship—but it 
also lends itself to illegal activity. 
The most prominent illegal use of Tor is the Silk Road, an online 
marketplace, like a black-market eBay, where users can anonymously buy 
illegal products, primarily drugs.212 To add to the anonymity, purchases on 
the Silk Road are made using Bitcoin, a form of online currency stored in a 
virtual wallet, so that no physical address or person need be tied to it.213 The 
 
208 See, e.g., Wendi Adelson, Child Trafficking and the Unavoidable Internet, 19 SW. J. 
INT’L L. 281, 289 (2013). 
209 ANDERSON, supra note 29, at 232.  
210 Id. at 232–33. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 229–30; MIKE POWER, DRUGS UNLIMITED: THE WEB REVOLUTION THAT’S 
CHANGING HOW THE WORLD GETS HIGH 214–15 (2013).  
213 See POWER, supra note 212, at 222 (“The architecture of bitcoin, the currency used on 
the Silk Road by dealers and users, and other services deployed by the site, mean the money 
cannot be simply followed.”); see also Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, 
WIRED MAG., Dec. 2011, at 99. 
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federal government recently shuttered the Silk Road and captured the site’s 
alleged leader, Ross Ulbricht, known online as “Dread Pirate Roberts,” 
charging him with conspiring to engage in drug trafficking, money 
laundering, and computer hacking.214 In two years, the government alleged, 
the site’s users completed roughly 1.2 million transactions generating 
revenue of nearly 10 million Bitcoin, equating to roughly $1.2 billion (at 
the time of Ulbricht’s arrest).215  
No court has directly commented on Tor’s legality, but it is widely 
assumed that onion routing, like file-sharing or other anonymizing software, 
is not illegal of its own accord in the United States.216 Indeed, even the 
complaint against Ulbricht, in observing that Tor “is known to be used by 
cybercriminals,” concedes that it “has known legitimate uses.”217 The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation goes further, explaining that, although it 
“cannot guarantee” operators of Tor relays “will never face any legal 
liability,” it “believes so strongly that those running Tor relays shouldn’t be 
liable for traffic that passes through the relay that we’re running our own 
middle relay.”218 The Foundation warns, however, that Tor relay operators 
risk criminal liability “if they monitor, log, or disclose Tor users’ 
communications.”219 Legal commentators generally agree with this 
 
214 Ulbricht was actually charged in two places. The U.S. Attorney in Maryland indicted 
him by grand jury. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 13-cr-00222-CCB 
(D. Md. Oct. 1, 2013), ECF No. 4 [hereinafter Ulbricht Maryland Indictment]. And the U.S. 
Attorney in the Southern District of New York filed a criminal complaint against him. 
Sealed Complaint, United States v. Ulbricht, 13-cv-06919-JPO, Ex. A (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 
2013), ECF No. 4-1 [hereinafter Ulbricht New York Complaint]. Ulbricht was eventually 
moved to New York, where he went to trial and was found guilty on all seven counts of the 
New York Complaint. See Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Convicted 
of All 7 Charges, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015, 3:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/silk-road-
ross-ulbricht-verdict, archived at http://perma.cc/2XAX-5EXA.   
215 Ulbricht New York Complaint, supra note 214, at 15. In June 2014, the United States 
Marshals Service announced that it would be auctioning off 29,656 Bitcoin seized from Silk 
Road servers and valued at more than $17.5 million. Cyrus Farivar, US to Auction 29,656 
Bitcoins Seized from Silk Road, ARS TECHNICA (June 12, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/us-to-auction-off-29656-bitcoins-seized-from-silk-
road-worth-over-17-5m/, archived at http://perma.cc/JD8Y-F2MC. 
216 Tor’s legality is more questionable in other countries. See Keith D. Watson, Note, 
The Tor Network: A Global Inquiry into the Legal Status of Anonymity Networks, 11 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 715, 723–33 (2012) (comparing regulation of Tor in the United 
States to regulation of Tor in China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 
217 Ulbricht New York Complaint, supra note 214, at 7. 
218 Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators, THE TOR 
PROJECT (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6Z28-9NX2. 
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assessment: Tor operators who avoid monitoring user communications are 
shielded from the liability that might arise from illegal transmissions, such 
as copyright infringement or child pornography.220 Yet this “shield” sounds 
a great deal like willful blindness. 
Despite this apparent legality, Tor has seemed to some a logical target 
for regulatory action.221 Faced with serious threats of cybercrime like illicit 
drug and firearm sales, and with no easy way to go after suppliers or buyers 
en masse, the government may view Tor and technologies like it as a 
vulnerable choke point. If the government can figure out who operates Tor 
relays, officials may assume they can effectively discourage illegal behavior 
by narrowing their efforts on these relay operators, viewing them as an easy 
way to the “blood and flesh” enabling the cloaking of illegal network 
activity. But targeting Tor relays may lead officials into a wasteful approach 
where they, as Senator Tom Carper puts it, “play ‘whack-a-mole’ with the 
latest website, currency, or other method criminals are using in an effort to 
evade the law.”222 The Silk Road exemplifies this problem: barely a month 
after the original site had been shut down, Silk Road 2.0 had emerged, with 
 
220 See Watson, supra note 216, at 725. Watson noted: 
Because the DMCA was not intended to cover and did not anticipate anonymity networks like 
Tor, it seems unlikely that a court would apply its provisions to Tor. Furthermore, one might 
question whether an exit node facilitator could face liability for child pornography charges. 
There would seem to be liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 if someone knowingly facilitated the 
downloading of child pornography, but the whole point of Tor is that exit-node facilitators do not 
know what is being routed through their computers. 
Id. (citations omitted); Nassim Nazemi, Comment, DMCA § 512 Safe Harbor for Anonymity 
Networks amid a Cyber-Democratic Storm: Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 855, 892 (2012). Nazemi concluded: 
Tor operators, by their very existence, trigger a political dialogue about the importance of online 
civil liberties, and their services facilitate the development of democratic culture in places like 
Iran. They demonstrate that Tor has undeniable noninfringing uses that merit protection, and its 
volunteer operators should thus enjoy full First Amendment protection. At a minimum, they 
should benefit from § 512(a) safe harbor as conduits of digital communication.  
Id. Further, Richard Abbott observes, “Tor’s birthplace in the world of intelligence could 
protect it from any legal attack” because courts may be hesitant to impede the use of a tool 
that “is truly a national security asset.” See Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA 
Away, J. INTERNET L., May 2010, at 22, 26–27. 
221 See Watson, supra note 216, at 726 (discussing proposals to regulate Tor). 
222 Press Release, Tom Carper, Senator for Del., Chairman Carper Statement on the 
Unveiling of the So-Called “Silk Road 2.0” Website (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.carper.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=8f085bea-7b56-4186-a561-cc37bbf17519, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X5LH-2WR8. See also Cyrus Farivar, Just a Month After 
Shutdown, Silk Road 2.0 Emerges, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 6, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/business/2013/11/just-a-month-after-shutdown-silk-road-2-0-emerges/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7384-DDMP.  
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drug vendors in tow, and, true to the moniker, a new “Dread Pirate Roberts” 
at the helm.223 And when Silk Road 2.0 was eventually shut down, new 
“Dark Web” services sprouted up, offering even more listings of narcotics 
for sale than their predecessor.224 Tor is hardly unique in this respect and 
may represent a trend: as more and more of the world comes online, the 
chances of sinking a criminal industry with a single blow decrease as 
well.225 
Before predicting how courts might address Tor in a criminal 
proceeding, consider one more technology that, like Tor, is created for good 
but highly susceptible to illegal use: network-security toolkits. For as little 
as $10 per month, any person can pay a “booter” site, like twBooter, for an 
account allowing the person to launch repeated denial-of-service attacks 
against a website; a bit more money will buy more accounts, upping the 
ante of the attack.226 These attacks can take multiple forms, but the general 
idea is to overwhelm the target’s servers or network connections and 
disable the site, at least temporarily.227 The advertised purpose of these 
services is for sites to test their security—twBooter sells itself as “The 
Ultimate Administrative Network Stresser Tool”228—but the potential for 
foul play is obvious, especially when the barriers to use are minimal. 
 
223 Id. The character of the “Dread Pirate Roberts” comes from the book and the film The 
Princess Bride, which ultimately discloses “that Roberts is not one man, but a series of 
individuals who periodically pass the name and reputation to a chosen successor.” Dread 
Pirate Roberts, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dread_Pirate_Roberts (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SL3W-8JJK. In fact, that pattern continues: in 
mid-2014, the second Dread Pirate Roberts stepped down, appointing an interim leader with 
the pseudonym “Defcon.” Ken Klippenstein, What It’s Like to Work for a Darknet Kingpin, 
ARS TECHNICA (June 8, 2014, 7:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/
punching-the-clock-for-a-darknet-kingpin/, archived at http://perma.cc/G92-B4M3.  
224 See Greenberg, supra note 214 (“Today’s leading dark web drug sites like Agora and 
Evolution offer more narcotics listings than the Silk Road ever did, and have outlived law 
enforcement’s crackdown on their competitors.”); Andy Greenberg, How the Dark Web’s 
New Favorite Drug Market Is Profiting from Silk Road 2’s Demise, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2014, 
8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/the-evolution-of-evolution-after-silk-road/. 
225 Richard Abbott makes a similar point in comparing Tor to Napster. Abbott, supra 
note 220, at 26 (“Tor is not Napster. There is no central authority to shut down and no key 
technology to outlaw. A court order in one country might shutdown a handful of nodes, but 
the removal of a substantial portion of nodes would require multinational cooperation.”).  
226 Sean Gallagher, Details on the Denial of Service Attack That Targeted Ars Technica, 
ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 18, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/details-
on-the-denial-of-service-attack-that-targeted-ars-technica/, archived at http://perma.cc/
RLB7-7NKE (describing “booter” attack on the Ars Technica website). 
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228 See TWBOOTER2, http://booter.eu/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/T5RQ-PDX3. 
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Unauthorized denial-of-service attacks are generally illegal under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,229 but the ultimate question is whether the 
existence of an obvious illegal use renders the provision of these tools as 
aiding and abetting. 
The answer must be “no,” for both network stressors and Tor relays. 
Like the red dress, these technologies may be used for good or ill, and it is 
not enough to inculpate a technology provider that it may be better, in terms 
of income for the business, if illicit activities flourish using the 
technology.230 In this sense, the key question is the closeness of operators’ 
relationships with users, not profitability. And that is one of the three key 
insights for technologists from the substantial unoffending uses analysis. 
V. FINAL THOUGHTS ON AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
So what are providers of “dual use” technology to do? It will not do to 
advise them not to “desire” to aid or abet criminal acts with their 
inventions, nor to implicitly agree to do the same. A clear heart and empty 
head is a valid defense, but one difficult to prove. Technologists will be 
tried not for their actual thoughts but for what they appeared to think. 
With that in mind, there are three final lessons technologists may take 
away. First, tailored services carry the greatest risk of criminal prosecution 
for aiding and abetting. Second, contract provisions will not prevent 
criminal culpability. Third, employees of technology companies face less 
risk of liability than their leaders. 
A. TAILORED SERVICES CARRY GREATER RISK THAN 
MASS-MARKET SERVICES 
As noted in the discussion of Tor and twBooter, tailored services carry 
greater risks than do mass-market services. So Tor relays in general have 
low potential for criminal liability, but Silk Road, which tailors and caters 
its services to crime, has a much higher liability. 
To understand why, analogize Tor relays to transit providers. (The 
Internet is, after all, the information super-highway.) In United States v. 
Heras, for instance, the defendant knowingly drove a friend to a drug meet, 
which the Second Circuit found sufficient to support a conviction for aiding 
 
229 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2012); see United States v. Schuster, 467 F.3d 614, 
615 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming sentence for man convicted under § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) for a 
denial-of-service attack). 
230 See Edmund J. Sease, From Microbes, to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: 
Patentability of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 551, 570–71 (1989). 
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and abetting drug crimes.231 The friend was otherwise uninvolved in the 
drug trade but knew that the purpose of the trip was for a drug deal.232 
Changing the relationship with the passenger from friend to customer in a 
taxicab makes little difference. The taxi driver cannot escape liability by 
insisting that he only wanted to be paid; many criminal relationships are 
mercenary. Allowing the taxi driver to escape criminal liability because his 
motive was payment, not a desire to see the crime succeed, would exonerate 
the hitman who does not care if his victim dies, so long as he is paid. If the 
jury believes that the taxi driver knew the trip’s purpose, it would not be 
reversible error to infer a desire to aid the crime. 
Critically, the result changes if the defendant drives a bus instead of a 
taxi. A bus driver who picks up the drug dealer on his normal route, 
overhears the drug dealer discussing the deal on his cell phone, and drops 
him off at a regular stop, does not abet a crime. No reasonable jury could 
infer that the driver had any desire to aid the drug deal, even though he 
knew the dealer’s purpose and also knew that driving his normal route 
would assist the crime. The bus has a substantial and unoffending purpose 
even when used by a criminal—the regular, scheduled transport of law-
abiding citizens along the same route. Put another way, all of the taxi’s 
bandwidth goes to transporting the criminal, while the bus driver’s 
bandwidth remains available to criminals and citizens alike. Moreover, the 
bus driver cannot refuse to aid the criminal without interfering with that 
substantial and unoffending purpose. If the bus driver is made criminal 
because just one of his riders is a criminal, then criminals would confer 
liability like a plague to everyone they touched. 
Like a virtual bus system, Tor relays provide a means of transmitting 
information—legal or illegal. Like the bus driver (and unlike the friend or 
taxi driver), they provide the same service to all, so the knowledge that 
some users might be criminals does not fairly support an inference of a 
desire to help them succeed. 
The bus driver’s defense, however, is not universal. If criminal users 
may be excluded without interruption of service, and the provider 
nonetheless permits—and even encourages—illegal uses of the product, as 
the government alleges with Megaupload, then a jury might fairly infer a 
desire to encourage criminal acts.233 Likewise, the defense is inapplicable to 
mass transit of criminal groups. A jury may justifiably reject a smuggler’s 
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claim to simply be driving his normal route, mindless of the immigration 
status of his passengers. 
One might think that the encrypted nature of Tor deserves the same 
inference of guilt, but it does not. Privacy is a substantial and unoffending 
use for technology. Just as an empty hidden compartment, or a secret cache 
filled with an embarrassing (but not illegal) collection of Beanie Babies is 
no crime, so, too, providing the means for secrecy on a mass scale is not 
aiding and abetting. A lesson for technologists is that tailored services, such 
as individual tutoring on how to hack a cable modem (or even providing a 
hacked modem), are far more likely to incur liability than mass-market 
services, such as writing a book or computer tutorial on how to hack a cable 
modem.234 Contact with individual users of a dual technology comes with 
an inference of a desire to help those users, and if the users are criminals, 
their criminal aims may be imputed to you.235 
The importance of noncontact with individual users was on display in 
the recent acquittal of Raul Rafael Roman Camacho, who found himself 
charged in a federal indictment because he worked at a business that helped 
 
234 This example comes from the real-life example of Ryan Harris, who wrote the book 
Hacking the Cable Modem (which is exactly what it sounds like) and also ran a website 
which, among other services, would send users hacked modems. The latter service, the 
actual hacking of modems, led to Harris’s federal conviction when one of his customers 
turned out to be an FBI agent. See Nate Anderson, How “The Angel” Helped 15,000 People 
Steal Broadband, ARS TECHNICA (June 29, 2012, 10:17 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/06/how-the-angel-helped-15000-people-steal-broadband, archived at http://
perma.cc/2ZUC-2LLC; http://perma.cc/PWJ2-94AH. The book, on the other hand, remains 
available for sale on Amazon.com. AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/
1593271018 (last visited Sept. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F5XT-
LXVX?type=image. 
235 Another example is that of Chad Dixon, who received a sentence of eight months for 
teaching customers how to “beat” a polygraph or “lie detector.” See Marisa Taylor, Man 
Gets Prison for Teaching How to Cheat on Polygraphs, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 7, 2013, at 
A2. At the same time, many books remain available on beating a polygraph, and one 
wonders if Dixon could have been convicted for reading them to his clients, as though to a 
child at bedtime. See, e.g., CHARLES CLIFTON, DECEPTION DETECTION: WINNING THE 
POLYGRAPH GAME (1991). Perhaps the starkest example would be to compare the infamous 
book Hitman: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, with someone giving one-
on-one tutelage to a would-be assassin. See REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL 
FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Bruce Scher ed., 1983). The lessons would be aiding and 
abetting in an elementary sense, even if the murder were never carried out. The book, on the 
other hand, is not a crime, though it was used to plan and commit a triple murder. See Karl 
Vick, Horn Convicted in Murders of Ex-Wife, Son and Nurse, WASH. POST, May 4, 1996, at 
A1. The book’s publisher destroyed all unsold copies of Hitman after the controversy, but 
the book has found new life on the Amazon Kindle. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/
Hit-Man-Technical-Independent-Contractors-ebook/dp/B007WU2NFG/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/T4BG-EATK. 
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people who did not have social security numbers to register their cars.236 
The government alleged that, because the business helped people without 
social security numbers, the business owner and all the employees were in a 
conspiracy to “encourage and induce” illegal immigration—i.e., a 
conspiracy to aid and abet illegal immigrants.237 The district court granted 
Roman Camacho’s motion for judgment of acquittal, noting that many 
people without social security numbers were not illegal aliens, such as those 
on student visas; in other words, the service had a substantial, unoffending 
use. And Roman Camacho never had contact with any of the customers, so 
he could not have known any customer was an illegal alien.238 On the 
Internet, services like Roman Camacho’s can be largely (or fully) 
automated, and the provider and client never interact at all. Because 
knowledge of the principal’s criminal purpose is essential to a charge of 
aiding and abetting, such automated services would be less likely to incur 
criminal liability for aiding and abetting. 
B. USELESSNESS OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS 
DISCLAIMING ILLEGAL INTENT 
Misunderstanding the problem and nature of aiding and abetting 
liability, some lawyers have offered rubbish in lieu of advice: insert clauses 
forbidding illegal use, require approval for sublicense or resale of 
technology, and stay informed about how your products and services are 
used.239 Some of these suggestions are beyond bad; following them would 
actually make the situation worse. The suggestion that providers state in 
licenses and user agreements that criminal use of their technology is 
prohibited is a fig leaf. No jury would be swayed by such boilerplate 
disavowals if the criminal use of a technologist’s products or services 
appears obvious in hindsight. Worse, the attempt to paper over the problem 
is transparent: no customer could claim breach when it was revealed that the 
customer intended to use the contracted-for products or services to commit 
a crime. A canny prosecutor would argue that such a clause could serve no 
other purpose but as an alibi for someone who wanted to contract with those 
with criminal designs. And the advice to “monitor” the customers’ use of 
technology, or even requiring clients to get permission before they resell or 
 
236 See United States v. Raul Rafael Roman Camacho, No. 3:12-cr-00067-JD-CAN-3 
(N.D. Ind. July 11, 2013) (order granting Rule 29 motion for acquittal on all charges). 
237 See id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
238 See id. 
239 See, e.g., Andrew H. Grant et al., Software Developer Accused of Aiding and Abetting 
Illegal Gambling, PERKINS COIE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/
Update_13_12_Gambling.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P8US-S5G5. 
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relicense the technology, rings discordant with both business reality and 
legal consequence. Knowledge of illegal use has been the lynchpin of 
successful prosecutions;240 now counsel suggests actively acquiring such 
knowledge. That advice goes beyond a warning against reliance on willful 
blindness; it suggests that clients should deputize themselves as government 
investigators. Absent an affirmative duty to police their technology, as with 
contractors selling advanced weapons systems,241 few companies would 
willingly adopt such a role. For a few, this will be because the pecuniary 
benefits of sweeping in illicit customers with innocent ones prove too 
tempting a lure. But no doubt the overwhelming majority will find policing 
their customers both impractical and undesirable—even law-abiding 
customers will object to a perpetual set of eyes reading over their shoulder. 
The harsh truth is that lawyers have no easy answers, and purveyors of 
dual-use technology must accept the risk of prosecution as a cost of doing 
business and that the likelihood of prosecution (and of conviction) is 
inversely related to the degree of substantial unoffending uses. The closest 
thing to a “safe harbor” may be found by analogy to the law of civil asset 
forfeiture. A car may be forfeited when used in a crime, even if the owner is 
never charged. But rental car companies do not respond to this by inserting 
disclaimers in rental contracts against use of the car to transport 
methamphetamine, nor do they track their customer’s movements in an 
effort to detect smugglers. The company’s defense will be to prove one of 
two things: that they had no knowledge of the crime or that they tried to 
stop it. The best preparation against a criminal prosecution would be to 
prepare to meet this higher standard, rather than relying on the lower bar of 
reasonable doubt. As much as technologists may want to remain neutral, 
once they have knowledge that a specific user is employing their 
technology illegally, the only sure way to prevent prosecution is to take 
some action to stop it, such as cutting off access or even notifying law 
enforcement. 
Unfortunately, however, for those innovators for whom actively 
assisting law enforcement or interfering with the private decisions of their 
uses would be anathema, there is only uncertainty. A defense of lack of 
desire to aid criminal activity will rely on circumstantial evidence; the only 
direct evidence would be their own statements of their desire, which a jury 
might dismiss as self-serving. Aware that they will be judged for lack of 
 
240 See Watson, supra note 216, at 725 (“There would seem to be liability under 
18 U.S.C. § 2252 if someone knowingly facilitated the downloading of child pornography, 
but the whole point of Tor is that exit-node facilitators do not know what is being routed 
through their computers.”). 
241 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1–127.3. 
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foresight by juries with the benefit of hindsight, dual-use technologists must 
build a record day-by-day of their own innocence, tailoring their product to 
discourage illegal uses when possible and justifying every change by 
reference to its legal uses and markets. Yet this advice is no theriac to 
criminal liability, only a warning of dangers ahead. 
Another option, one increasingly adopted by technologists (and largely 
untested), has been to craft services and products that can be delivered 
anonymously, thus preventing the provider from having any knowledge of 
how the products will be used. Because knowledge can be shown 
extrinsically, it should be no surprise that the cases reviewing challenges to 
sufficiency of the evidence to infer intent or desire have seized upon proof 
of the abettor’s knowledge of the principal’s intent to commit a crime as 
sufficient evidence of the abettor’s intent do so as well.242 The existence of 
substantial, unoffending uses provides some positive, though 
circumstantial, proof of a lack of knowledge. Creating a product such as 
twBooter that can be used both by those trying to prevent hackers and by 
hackers themselves does not support an inference of a desire to support 
hackers. And desire to support criminal activity, despite some 
disagreement, is the mental state courts most consistently require to support 
a conviction for aiding and abetting. 
C. THE POTENTIAL FOR LENIENCY FOR EMPLOYEES 
One more minor point. This Article has already discussed how, even 
though the “substantial unoffending use” approach more consistently 
resolves the various appellate decisions describing the mental culpability 
required for aiding and abetting, there remain some gaps to be filled by 
other inquiries. One of these inquiries is the status of the defendant as an 
employee. 
For example, consider the manufacturing of methamphetamine, which 
requires large amounts of ingredients commonly found in over-the-counter 
cold medicine. Certainly cold medicines have substantial, unoffending uses 
 
242 For some recent examples, see, e.g., United States v. Willett, 751 F.3d 335, 340–43 
(5th Cir. 2014) (sustaining conviction for aiding and abetting health-care fraud based on 
evidence defendant knew about upcoding at medical practice); United States v. Lyons, 740 
F.3d 702, 715 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding it sufficient to sustain conviction of employee of 
bookmaking business that he knew the business received bets and he helped it continue 
receiving them); United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that evidence that a seller knew of a buyer’s intent to commit a crime with the seller’s goods 
is enough to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting, though not conspiracy); United 
States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (sustaining conviction for aiding and 
abetting drug crimes for driver of car who knew his rider’s purpose was to deal drugs). 
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(i.e., the treatment of colds), so the manufacture and sale of cold medicine 
could not be aiding and abetting in general. But imagine someone is 
approached outside a drug store by a stranger who asks the person to buy 
cold medicine and offers reimbursement at five times the retail price. 
If the person knew nothing of meth manufacture, and bought the cold 
medicine suspecting that something illegal might be happening but assumed 
it was something minor, and a jury believed that account, then the person 
would be acquitted. But a jury might reasonably disbelieve that defense 
after the prosecution introduced evidence that the person had recently 
streamed the entire series of Breaking Bad online. Under the circumstances, 
such a high mark-up for cold medicine could impute but one, illicit purpose. 
Even if the mark-up were much lower, the service provided (buying 
something on behalf of someone else) has no substantive, legal purpose, 
which is to say, the stranger could have no legitimate reason to ask 
someone else to buy cold medicine on her behalf. 
But the result might be different if the person was the cashier, and the 
“substantial unoffending uses” approach does not explain why. A cashier 
who saw the same people regularly purchasing cold medicine, without 
symptoms, might suspect (or even know) that the customers were buying it 
to produce meth. But the instinct is that the cashier, like the bus driver, is 
not guilty of aiding and abetting. The difference is neither the nature of the 
product nor the knowledge of how it will be used; it is the evidence that the 
only desire is not to help the customer but to serve the employer. The 
cashier and the bus driver are simply doing their job; in that sense, though, 
their motives are pecuniary, which would not acquit a mercenary, such as a 
driver who agrees to smuggle people across a border, not out of a desire to 
help immigrants reach a better life, but out of a desire for the cash paid up 
front. But it matters that the master served is not a criminal, but a legitimate 
employer. Even considering the sale of a gun to someone who vows to use 
it to kill, it matters whether the sale is one by a principal eager to profit 
from the sale of his gun, or if the sale is rung up by a teenage cashier whose 
sole focus is on his next cigarette break. But if employees gain a direct 
interest in the transaction, as with even a slight sales commission, they have 
the same pecuniary motive as the principal, and a jury may infer the same 
desire to aid the crime in exchange for cash. 
The lesson for technology providers is that digital entrepreneurs and 
hired guns face greater risk than employees when working on “dual use” 
technologies. Employee status is not a safe harbor if it becomes clear that 
the employees’ work furthers a criminal enterprise, but employees are less 
likely to be held liable for aiding and abetting the customers of an employer 
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than for aiding and abetting customers of their own businesses, absent some 
profit-sharing arrangement. 
CONCLUSION 
When and how to allow proof of thought crimes by circumstantial 
evidence remains the most enduring and integral problem in criminal law. 
And the “substantial unoffending uses” test is not Alexander’s sword that 
will cleave away complexity. Only a freely given admission of the 
defendant’s own desire to aid a crime has ever offered that clarity. But in 
the hard cases, those that require an inference of the defendant’s desires, the 
“substantial unoffending uses” test loosens the knot, inviting judges, juries, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys to tug at another thread, one that will lead 
to a narrower and more consistent application of the law of aiding and 
abetting. 
  
 
